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Abstract
Levirate marriage, whereby a widow is inherited by male relatives of her deceased husband, has anecdotally
been viewed as informal insurance for widows who have limited property rights. This study investigates why
this widespread practice in sub-Saharan Africa has recently been disappearing. A developed game-theoretic
analysis reveals that levirate marriage arises as a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium when a husband's
clan desires to keep children of the deceased within its extended family and widows have limited independent
livelihood means. Female empowerment renders levirate marriage redundant because it increases widows' reser-
vation utility. HIV/AIDS also discourages a husband's clan from inheriting a widow who loses her husband
to HIV/AIDS, reducing her remarriage prospects and thus, reservation utility because she is likely to be HIV
positive. Consequently, widows' welfare tends to decline (increase) in step with the deterioration of levirate
marriage driven by HIV/AIDS (female empowerment). By exploiting long-term household panel data drawn
from rural Tanzania and testing multiple theoretical predictions relevant to widows' welfare and women's fertil-
ity, this study nds that HIV/AIDS is primarily responsible for the deterioration of levirate marriage. Young
widows in Africa may need some form of social protection against the inuence of HIV/AIDS.
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1 Introduction
Levirate marriage (also known as widow or wife inheritance) is a common marital practice in many societies around
the world. According to this practice, a widow is inherited by the brother or other male relative of her deceased
husband. While this practice is still observed in many societies in present-day Africa (Potash, 1986; Radclie-
Brown and Forde, 1987), as seen in Kenya (Agot, 2007), Nigeria (Doosuur and Arome, 2013), Sudan (Stern, 2012),
Uganda (Ntozi, 1997), and Zambia (Malungo, 2001), this century-old practice has recently begun to disappear.
This study explores the reasons for the deterioration of this practice in sub-Saharan Africa.
This institutional change should be given considerable attention because anecdotally levirate marriage has been
considered to be an informal safety net that provides material support and social protection for widows despite
it being seen as treating women as \property." Therefore, it is expected that this institutional change will have
signicant consequences for economic development by altering both ex-ante (for currently married women) and ex-
post (for current widows) welfare gains associated with widowhood. Until now, however, there has been no eort
by economists to better understand the role and socioeconomic consequences of this practice despite its popularity
and economic signicance.
This customary practice also has much policy relevance in sub-Saharan Africa, where widows comprise a sig-
nicant proportion of the population because of their husbands' deaths being attributed to typical age dierences
between a couple and, more recently, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. According to Potash (1986), a quarter of the
adult female population is widowed in many African societies. Traditionally, a widow has limited rights to the
property of both her natal and husband's families; therefore, her life is highly vulnerable. Furthermore, owing to a
customary system of exogamous and patrilocal marriage, a widow's close relatives (e.g., parents, siblings) typically
live outside her current residential village and, thus, cannot easily provide her with appropriate life protection. A
relatively recent empirical study conducted in northern Tanzania also found that a large increase in the murder of
\witches," typically elderly widowed women, is associated with their small contribution to a household's earning
capacity (Miguel, 2005). Despite the evident vulnerability of widows' livelihood, however, their protection has, thus
far, not been actively considered on the development agenda (compared with debates about \child" and \old-age"
protection), and their lives and survival strategies are insuciently understood (van de Walle, 2013).
To address the question, this study rst develops a simple theoretical framework wherein levirate marriage
arises as a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in an extensive-form game played by two agents, i.e., a
widow and her husband's clan. This model builds upon the assumption that in a patriarchal African society, great
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emphasis is placed on continuation of generations (e.g., Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987; Tertilt, 2005). In this game,
the clan rst oers livelihood support to widows in the form of levirate marriage. Widows, who otherwise have
only subsistence resources, have an incentive to accept this oer although the material support is marginal. A
husband's clan responds to a widow's strategic choice by providing her with minimal social protection to keep the
children and (as caretakers) wives of the deceased within its extended family (e.g., Muller, 2005; Stern, 2012).
Based on this framework, two possible mechanisms (and their combination) that result in the disappearance
of levirate marriage are considered. First, female empowerment (as a source of improved women's property rights,
for example) may make this practice obsolete while potentially increasing widows' welfare.
On the other hand, it is also presumed that the recent spread of HIV/AIDS has contributed much to the
deterioration of this practice (e.g., Malungo, 2001; Ntozi, 1997; Perry et al., 2014). In other words, if a husband's
death is attributed to AIDS, the wives may also be HIV positive. Then, by having sexual intercourse with the
widows, the inheritors (and their wives and even the children born to them later) may get infected with HIV.
Therefore, a husband's clan has a strong incentive to avoid this practice. In this case, widows may lose this
traditional safety net. Notably, this institutional change would not increase the widows' welfare, because a clan
already squeezes utility from widows even in the presence of levirate marriage, and widows enjoy reservation utility
both before and after the dissolution of levirate marriage. What is worse, since it is expected that HIV-positive
widows also have diculties in getting remarried, the spread of this infectious disease could decrease widows'
welfare by reducing their reservation utility while simultaneously eliminating levirate marriage.
To empirically examine why levirate marriage is disappearing, this study uses one unique setting observed in
a long-term household panel survey conducted in Kagera, a rural region of northwest Tanzania (Kagera Health
and Development Survey, KHDS). Group discussions with the village leaders revealed that the practice of levirate
marriage had become less common in a signicant proportion of the sample villages between 1991 (wave 1 of the
KHDS) and 2004 (wave 5). For its empirical analysis, this study develops a testing strategy that allows it to
address its question based on this setting.
While one straightforward way to assess the mechanisms responsible for the disappearance of levirate marriage is
to evaluate the probability that a widow enters into this customary marriage as a result of the spread of HIV/AIDS
and/or female empowerment, this approach cannot be adopted in this study. This is because information relevant
to widows' engagement in levirate marriage at the individual level is absent in the KHDS data. Such information is
also rarely obtained (even at the community level) from standard household surveys currently in use. Collection of
original panel data that records the deterioration of levirate marriage in the long term also prevents the immediate
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investigation of such a signicant ongoing economic transition.
As an alternative, the above setting observed in the KHDS is used. As described above, it is theoretically
predicted that widows' welfare tends to decline (increase) in step with the dissolution of levirate marriage as a
result of the spread of HIV/AIDS (female empowerment). Consequently, in this study, a correlation between the
deterioration of levirate marriage and widows' welfare is explored to elucidate the mechanisms responsible for
this institutional change, with the former discerned from the KHDS at the community level and the latter at the
individual level. Based on the theoretical predictions, this correlation is likely to be negative (positive) if a primary
factor driving such institutional change is HIV/AIDS (female empowerment).
In addition, a correlation between this institutional change and parental fertility decisions is also empirically
examined. The aforementioned theory also predicts that HIV/AIDS possibly increases fertility while destroying
levirate marriage. This fertility response arises if widows' de facto property rights are established in response
to the reduction of male labor force caused by HIV/AIDS, which in turn enables them to aord many children
in widowhood. In Uganda (e.g., Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi, 1995) and Zambia (e.g., Malungo, 2001), cases have
increasingly been reported of property being left to widows and their children owing to HIV/AIDS and the resulting
deterioration of levirate marriage.
Since the empirical goal is to identify a correlation attributed only to the theoretical mechanisms that this study
focuses on, it is still required to exclude inuence of any confounding factors that prevent the current investigation
from estimating such a correlation. To meet this objective, this study takes a triple-dierence strategy that
compares relevant outcomes before (wave 1) and after (wave 5) the institutional change between villages that made
the practice of levirate marriage less customary and the remaining villages. The third source of dierence comes
from a comparison between widows and other females for estimating consumption or that between the young and old
population for the analysis of fertility. This approach allows controlling for time-varying village-level characteristics
that aected the KHDS villages over time in a dierent manner, i.e., village-specic linear time trends.
As the empirical analysis shows, the disappearance of levirate marriage was negatively associated with young
widows' consumption while having a positive correlation with young wives' fertility. In addition, based on further
analyses of information pertaining to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in a KHDS community, these correlations were
more pronounced in villages whereby this communicable disease increasingly exerted an unfavorable health inuence
during the sample periods. Moreover, HIV/AIDS decreased young widows' consumption and encouraged fertility
of young wives. The last two ndings are also consistent with the theoretical predictions and may be seen as
the reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS. Thus, all these ndings collectively provide support for the view that a
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primary factor facilitating the recent deterioration of levirate marriage in sub-Saharan Africa is HIV/AIDS. The
ndings of numerous qualitative studies as well as the author's careful eld observations in rural Tanzania also
support this claim. Based on this study's ndings, young widows may urgently need social protection that shields
them from the inuence of this communicable disease.
This study explores the \economics" of levirate marriage for the rst time. In contrast with several studies
referring to institutions as exogenous social rules (e.g., North, 1990), the economic explanation of levirate marriage
denes this customary institution as a system that contains rules and outcomes, both of which are endogenously
determined (Greif and Kingston, 2011). The proposed game-theoretic framework is also in line with theoretical
studies dening culture as beliefs (e.g., Greif, 1994) rather than as values (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), with
the former sustaining Nash equilibria and the latter equivalent to the concept of preferences. While this theoretical
framework is developed primarily in the African context, it may also apply to similar practices in other areas, such
as widow remarriage in northern India (e.g., Chowndhry, 1994). Applying an economic approach to an issue that
has been addressed mainly in anthropological studies, the current research will encourage relevant debate within a
much broader scientic context (e.g., La Ferrara, 2007).
This study's theoretical and empirical attempt to understand the economics of levirate marriage will also
contribute to a rapidly growing body of economic research on culture, social norms, and institutions (e.g., Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015; Fernandez, 2011; Guiso et al., 2006; Platteau, 2000; Young, 2015), specically to studies
examining the economic rationality of apparent antisocial marriage-related customs that violate women's human
rights, such as dowry/bridewealth payments (e.g., Anderson, 2007; Becker, 1981; Botticini and Siow, 2003; Brown,
2009; Zhang and Chan, 1999) and polygyny (e.g., Becker, 1981; Dalton and Leung, 2014; Jacoby, 1995).
While the ndings of this study come from a specic marriage-related practice, its demonstration of mechanisms
responsible for the deterioration of levirate marriage will also improve the general understanding of conditions that
facilitate the transformation of cultural institutions, as in studies of dowry ination (e.g., Anderson, 2003) and
transition from polygynous to monogamous mating (e.g., Gould et al., 2008). In particular, several previous studies
indicate that positive socioeconomic shocks (e.g., English-education opportunities) aecting disadvantaged groups
(e.g., girls) could erode traditional institutions (e.g., caste) while increasing their welfare (Luke and Munshi, 2011;
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006). In contrast, this study will show that negative shocks (e.g., HIV/AIDS) supposedly
inuencing advantaged groups (e.g., a husband's clan) may also break down traditional institutions (e.g., levirate
marriage), possibly swiftly, while reducing disadvantaged groups' (e.g., widows') welfare.
Furthermore, this study also contributes to the literature on the link between HIV/AIDS and fertility in sub-
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Saharan Africa. While previous studies have provided somewhat inconclusive evidence of the impact of HIV/AIDS
on fertility in this region (e.g., Fortson, 2009; Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan, 2011; Young, 2005, 2007), this research will
highlight the importance of exploring its heterogeneity by showing one mechanism through which this infectious
disease aects fertility.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model that explains the mechanisms driving
the deterioration of levirate marriage. A strategy to test for the mechanisms responsible for this institutional
change is presented in Section 3, followed by the data overview in Section 4. Section 5 reports the empirical
ndings, whose interpretation is carefully discussed in Section 6. Concluding remarks are summarized in Section
7.
2 A simple theoretical framework
This section oers a simple theoretical framework that considers the presence of levirate marriage in a traditional
economy as a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. The purpose is to facilitate the discussion that follows
in Section 3, whereby a strategy to empirically explore the mechanisms responsible for the deterioration of levirate
marriage is developed. All the relevant propositions are proved in Section S.4 in the supplemental appendix.
As noted in Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) and elsewhere (e.g., Tertilt, 2005), the model builds upon several
features of family relationships typically observed in sub-Saharan Africa. First, societies are patrilineal; succession
is passed down the male line. Daughters, customarily, do not inherit their parents' property, and almost all females
that reach marriageable age as determined by their respective societies, enter into marital relationships. Owing
to the rules of clan exogamy and patrilocality, at marriage, a woman often moves some distance away from her
natal village to her husband's home. Traditional belief systems place a great emphasis on the continuation of
generations. Thus, marriage can be seen as acquisition of a bride's reproductive capacity by her husband's clan,
which is made in exchange for bridewealth payments made to her parents. However, a bride is typically left out of
fertility decisions as they are largely made by senior male members of her husband's clan (including the groom) in a
patriarchal society. Nevertheless, mothers shoulder the main responsibility for providing for the day-to-day material
and emotional care of their children. As males must accumulate sucient wealth to aord a bride (including bride
prices), they usually marry later than females (e.g., Goody and Tambiah, 1974). The resulting age dierences
between couples mean that it is common to nd women who have lost their husbands.
Based on these stylized observations, consider an agrarian society with two agents: a widow (or a widow's
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parents) (w) and an extended family of her deceased husband, called here a \clan" (c). The sequence of actions
taken by both agents is as follows (see also Figure 1). First, after marriage, a husband's clan (particularly, male
members) determines the number of children n that a woman should bear before her husband's death. This
assumption simplies the case of a man's family members putting some pressure on a young couple's fertility
decisions during their married life, which is not implausible in reality. Second, after the husband's death, the clan
chooses the amount of livelihood support s  0 that will be provided to the widows in the form of levirate marriage.
In the face of an oer of livelihood support, a widow decides whether to accept levirate marriage. The acceptance
(action a) allows a widow to exploit her husband's property (e.g., house, land) while living with her children. In
case of rejection or absence of the provision (i.e., s = 0), she has two choices. First, she can formally inherit
her husband's property and live with her children (action z). Else, she can leave her husband's home (action l).
Consequently, the strategy prole taken by both agents can be characterized as (n, s, m), whereby m 2 (a; z; l)
refers to choices that a woman can make after her husband dies.
Similar to Tertilt (2005)'s theoretical model of marriage and fertility developed in the context of sub-Saharan
Africa, it is assumed that the clan chooses the number of children n, given the convex cost c(n) of raising them,
such that c0(n) > 0, c00(n) > 0, and c(0) = 0.1 This cost is incurred by either a mother whenever she is available
or female members of the clan. The payos vi(; ; ) of an agent i (either c or w) are demonstrated as follows; the
rst and second terms in parenthesis indicate the number of children n and the amount of s with the third term
referring to a widow's action:
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  s; (1)
vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n); (2)
vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (3)
vw(n; s; l) = r; (4)
vc(n; s; z) = u(n)  k; (5)
vw(n; s; z) = k   c(n): (6)
If the oered levirate marriage is accepted, the clan obtains positive utility u(n) such that u0(n) > 0, u00(n) < 0, and
u(0) = 0 by maintaining children of the deceased within its extended family. However, this utility can be achieved
1One example of the explanation for the convexity is unfavorable externalities that have a bearing on family members' health. If
one child contracts some infectious disease, often the remaining children (or even parents) also get infected.
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in exchange of (endogenously determined) material support s (e.g., provision of subsistence needs, permission of
access to the clan's property). The widow can enjoy the support with children left in her charge, resulting in
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)   s and vw(n; s; a) = s   c(n). Notably, it is assumed that a widow gains no utility from just
staying with her children, which simplies the analysis.
In case of the rejection or absence of the oered levirate marriage, a widow receives exogenously determined
reservation utility r 2 R when she leaves her husband's home. For instance, she may receive this reservation utility
by remarrying or inheriting her parents' property.2 A widow can leave either with or without her children. If a
widow leaves with her children, she incurs the child-rearing cost c(n). If she leaves alone, she does not incur this cost
while facilitating female members of her husband's clan to take care of the children left behind. The child-rearing
cost incurred by the female members is assumed to be greater by an amount of  > 0, compared with the case where
a widow takes care of her own children. This is because the clan's female members have work to do at their own
homes (including raising their children) and thus, there are both the material and opportunity costs of taking care
of the children of the deceased.3 Note that given the aforementioned assumption that a widow receives no utility
stemming from \just stay together," she does not lose utility by separating from her own children. Consequently,
a widow strictly prefers to leave alone rather than to leave with her children, yielding vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)  
and vw(n; s; l) = r.
A widow's separation from her own children is not uncommon in rural Africa, which is also reinforced by the
practice of bride prices. If a widow leaves with her children, she or her parents typically have to repay the bride
price (given to her parents at marriage) to the clan. On the other hand, if she moves out and leaves her children
to the husband's clan, this repayment is not required. Moreover, a widow may not suer much emotionally from
leaving alone. For example, widowed women belonging to the Luo in Kenya, an ethnic group famous for the practice
of levirate marriage, can easily return to meet their children even if they leave a husband's community (Potash,
1986, p. 41). Nevertheless, a widow's (emotional) cost resulting from separation from her own children is explicitly
taken into account in subsection S.1.2 in the supplemental appendix. As seen from the analysis, the key theoretical
implications demonstrated below are robust to this consideration.
Alternatively, a widow can also choose to make a livelihood with her children by using a socially accepted
2For example, it is reported that remarriage is an important alternative to levirate marriage for young widows' survival in Uganda
(Nyanzi et al., 2009).
3The model included these costs to explicitly consider why a clan encourages a widow to accept levirate marriage, rather than
facilitating its female members to take care of children of the deceased. However, the key theoretical implications demonstrated below
remain unchanged by treating  = 0, provided it is alternatively assumed that r0 < 0, r1 > r0, and r2 < r0. Moreover, it is also
possible to regard the child-rearing cost incurred by a clan as (1+)c(n), rather than c(n)+ . In this case, a woman's fertility possibly
decreases when a widow's reservation utility increases from r0 = 0 to r1 > 0, which is not indicated in the subsequent proposition 3.
This fertility response arises because a clan's child-rearing cost arising from widows' action l increases in proportion to the number of
children. However, the remaining theoretical implications are robust to this dierence when modeling a clan's child-rearing cost.
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(and thus, exogenous) amount of a husband's bequest k  0 transferred from a husband's clan to her and/or
her children (and measured by transferable utility), which enables them to be self-sucient. For example, in a
traditional society that does not allow a widow or her (young) children to inherit property of the deceased, this
amount is expected to be zero. These yield the remaining payo proles vc(n; s; z) = u(n)   k and vw(n; s; z) =
k   c(n).
Based on a customary rule in Africa, a widow's rights are often tied to her children's rights. Namely, having
children (in particular, sons) allows her to remain a member of her husband's clan, and therefore to claim access
to the deceased's property (Rwebangira, 1996).4 By assuming that the property of the deceased is bequeathed
not only to a widow but also to her children, it is also possible to analyze this practice in the present theoretical
framework.
[Here, Figure 1]
2.1 Optimal strategies and equilibrium
Depending upon the levels of a widow's (or her children's) property rights k and reservation utility r, it can be
shown that levirate marriage is subgame perfect. Assume that widows have limited independent livelihood means
such that r = r0 = 0. In addition, widows' rights to inherit a husband's property is also highly limited in the sense
that k = k0  c(n), whereby n satises u0(n) = c0(n). Then, it is easy to verify that
Proposition 1 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k0  c(n), the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect, along
with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Since widows cannot support themselves independently, they have an incentive to receive support from their
husband's clan. In contrast, a clan also has an incentive to oer levirate marriage to retain the widow's children
within the extended family. Thus, this practice is sustained.
As the equilibrium payo indicates, while a widow receives material support (i.e., s = c(n)) from her husband's
clan by agreeing to a levirate marriage, the amount may not necessarily be large. Ethnographic studies (e.g.,
Doosuur and Arome, 2013; Luke, 2002; Nyanzi et al., 2009) show that material support provided by inheritors is
typically minimal, because the inheritors normally have to take care of their wives and children at their original
home in addition to the widows who continue to reside at their deceased husband's home (e.g., Ndisi, 1974). Thus,
4Indeed, it appears that this practice exists based on the author's eld interviews (made with rural females aged 30 to 40 years)
in Kagera in 2012 (Kudo, 2015). In 2012, the author conducted a short questionnaire-based survey about local marital practices in
Karagwe, a district in the Kagera region, with support from one supervisor of the KHDS project (wave 5). This survey revealed that
the locals were prone to believe that widows could have access to a husband's property if they had children.
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the model prediction may be consistent with this nding.5 Furthermore, a clan protects widows because they take
care of the deceased's children with the child-rearing cost being smaller than the corresponding cost incurred by a
clan's female members, i.e., c(n) < c(n) +  .
2.2 Institutional change
Focusing on an economy that traditionally practices levirate marriage, the analysis in this subsection reveals several
mechanisms that trigger institutional changes.
2.2.1 Female empowerment: An increase in k
Female empowerment may render the practice of levirate marriage redundant. In Tanzania, many gender-oriented
perspectives were introduced in the political sphere in the 1990s. One remarkable example is the establishment
of the Land Act of 1999 and the Village Land Act of 1999, enabling men and women to enjoy equal land rights
(Killian, 2011). In fact, in the KHDS data, several villages that prohibited widows from inheriting a husband's
major properties (e.g., land, house) appear to have removed this discrimination between 1991 and 2004. Assuming
that a widow can inherit a sucient amount of her husband's property such that k = k1 > c(n
),
Proposition 2 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k1 > c(n
), the strategy proles (n1; c(n1); a) and (n1; 0; z) are subgame
perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n1 > n
 and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Here, n1 satises k1   c(n1) = 0.
On one hand, securing a widow's right to inherit her husband's property increases her utility obtained outside
a levirate marriage. To encourage such widows to remain in this traditional marriage, a clan must increase the
amount of support s, which makes this practice costly and may undermine it. Note that increases in bequest
amounts allow widows to aord many children. Accordingly, a clan increases the number of children to the level
of n1 > n
.
On the other hand, in an economy that already practices levirate marriage, the proposition 2 also suggests
that solely improving widows' property rights may not always eliminate this social institution. This is because the
strategy prole (n1; c(n1); a) is still subgame perfect.
5In the author's eld survey in Rorya in Tanzania (see subsection 2.3 for the details), a relatively large number of Luo widows
indicated that material support from inheritors only helped satisfy their subsistence needs. This eld observation is also compatible
with the model prediction.
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2.2.2 Female empowerment: An increase in r
The female empowerment one observed in Tanzania in the 1990s might also have secured women's rights to inherit
their parents' property while increasing widows' reservation utility. Considering the case that r = r1 > 0, it can
be shown that
Proposition 3 When r = r1 >  and k = k0  c(n), the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect, along with
the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r1 > 0. When r = r1   and k = k0  c(n), the
strategy prole (n; c(n)+r1; a) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's
payo r1 > 0.
When widows can suciently aord their own livelihood such that r1 >  , levirate marriage breaks down. The
mechanism of this institutional change is simple. Owing to an increase in the availability of outside options, widows
do not have to rely on levirate marriage to make a livelihood. To prompt such widows to enter into a levirate
marriage, a clan must increase the amount of support s, which makes the practice costly. As a result, this practice
disappears. In this case, the dissolution of a levirate marriage coincides with an increase in a widow's welfare (i.e.,
r1 > 0).
Indeed, this equilibrium appears to exist among some ethnic groups in Tanzania, such as the Zita (as determined
through the author's eld interviews) and Nyakusa (Wilson, 1987, p. 123), with the former group primarily settling
in the Bunda district of the Mara region and the latter largely inhabiting the southern mountains of this country.
For instance, Zita widows are traditionally allowed to return to their natal villages in case of their husband's death
without repaying bride prices, conditional on their children being left behind. After returning home, they start a
new life by inheriting their parents' property and/or re-marrying, with their new husband now making bridewealth
payments to their parents.
2.2.3 HIV/AIDS
The spread of HIV/AIDS can also destroy the practice of levirate marriage. Two potential infection risks exist.
First, when a husband dies of HIV/AIDS, a widow is quite likely to be infected with the virus. By inheriting (and
having sexual intercourse with) a widow, a husband's clan members (e.g., an inheritor, an inheritor's wife) may also
contract HIV/AIDS. In addition, a seronegative widow may also become infected with the deadly virus, provided
that she is inherited by her husband's clan members who are HIV positive and/or that her inheritor already has
(possibly multiple) wives. These expected infection costs of a husband's clan hc > 0 and of a widow hw > 0 can
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be included in payos realized in the strategy prole (n; s; a), i.e., vc(n; s; a) = u(n)   s   hc and vw(n; s; a) =
s  c(n)  hw.
In theory, it is possible for a clan's members to avoid having such sexual intercourse with a likely HIV-positive
widow even if they inherit her. In a traditional society, however, the occurrence of levirate marriage typically
follows sexual cleansing. In other words, a brother-in-law or a clan's other male members perform one-time ritual
sex with a widow after the burial of her husband (e.g., Agot, 2007; Gunga, 2009). An uncleansed widow is perceived
as impure and dangerous to a community and her social interactions are quite restricted. Thus, this cleansing is
a pre-requisite for widows to be reintegrated into a society. Based on Berger (1994), it is argued that in Uganda,
levirate marriage is not possible unless it comes with the traditional component of sexual cleansing. As Malungo
(2001) observed in Zambia, widows who underwent sexual cleansing are typically expected to contract levirate
marriage. In addition, to fulll the culturally prescribed rituals, using a condom is often unacceptable based on
a traditional norms, as it means placing a barrier between the ritual performers (i.e., widows and the inheritors)
(e.g., Ambasa-Shisanya, 2007; Luke, 2002; Perry et al., 2014).
The infection costs of HIV/AIDS do not necessarily make widows avoid levirate marriage. First, the infection
risk of a husband's clan (hc) does not aect a widow's decision to accept levirate marriage. In addition, a widow
still has an incentive to follow the customary practice as long as her husband's clan compensates for her infection
risk (hw) by increasing the material support given to her.
Compared with widows, a husband's clan has more reason to stop the practice of levirate marriage. First, a
clan becomes reluctant to oer levirate marriage as the corresponding expected infection risk hc reduces the utility
arising from adherence to this social custom. Second, to encourage a widow to accept the traditional marriage,
a clan must increase its material support by the amount hw, which further discourages a clan from continuing
levirate marriage. Consequently,
Proposition 4 Assume that r = r0 = 0, k = k0  c(n), and the disease cost is high enough such that  < hc+hw.
Then, when   , the strategy prole (n0; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children
n0  n and a widow's payo r0 = 0. When  < , the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect, along with
the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Here, n0 satises k0   c(n0) = 0 and   u(n)  c(n)  u(n0) + c(n0)  0 (by denition of n).
The high disease cost ( < hc+hw) discourages a clan from practicing levirate marriage. When the child-rearing
cost borne by a clan's female members is large (i.e.,   ), a clan prefers a widow to take care of her children by
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relying on property bequeathed to her and her children. However, since the amount of bequest is not large (i.e.,
k = k0  c(n)), she cannot aord many children. As a result, the clan reduces the number of children to the level
of n0  n. When raising children of the deceased is not costly to a clan (i.e.,  < ), the clan encourages a widow
to leave her husband's home alone.
In contrast with the second example of female empowerment (i.e., an increase in r), this HIV/AIDS-driven
institutional change does not increase a widow's welfare because it keeps her equilibrium payo at the level of r0 =
0. Intuitively, even if the customary practice disappears because of the spread of HIV/AIDS, widows' social status
remains low both before and after the institutional change and therefore, there is no reason for them to experience
welfare improvements.
To make matters worse, it is also possible that the infectious disease reduces widows' reservation payos. This
is possible because widows who lose their husbands to HIV/AIDS may also be HIV positive and therefore, face
diculty in nding a new marital partner. This situation can be interpreted as r = r2 < 0. As a corollary of the
proposition 4, it is easy to expect that HIV/AIDS undermines levirate marriage while decreasing widows' welfare.
Kagera is one of the regions most seriously aected by HIV/AIDS in Tanzania. Owing to the government's
great eorts to fully understand the disease situation in this region, as seen in the Kagera AIDS Research Project
initiated in 1987 (Lugalla et al., 1999), people's awareness of AIDS had already been raised by the early 1990s
(e.g., Killewo et al., 1997; Killewo et al., 1998). In the KHDS data set, approximately 90% of 30 sample villages
that had practiced levirate marriage in the early 1980s made this practice less customary by 2004. The spread of
HIV/AIDS might have contributed to the disappearance of levirate marriage.
2.2.4 HIV/AIDS-induced female empowerment
In reality, the two mechanisms of female empowerment and of HIV/AIDS may not be mutually exclusive. One
example is that HIV/AIDS established widows' de facto property rights. In other words, the shrinkage of the male
labor force caused by HIV/AIDS enabled widows to obtain land rights in a family/village, as females had to control
land owing to a greater number of male deaths.
This HIV/AIDS-driven female empowerment is possible, going by the ndings provided by Goldstein and Udry
(2008); according to them, a person's agricultural eort is often associated with establishing his/her land tenure
in Africa. In addition, as will be delineated in subsection 6.1, this sort of female empowerment indeed appears
to have arisen in Uganda (e.g., Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi, 1995) and Zambia (e.g., Malungo, 2001). When this
situation, reected as k = k1 > c(n
), occurs simultaneously with the aforementioned HIV/AIDS-induced decline
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in widows' reservation payos (i.e., r = r2 < 0), it can be shown that
Proposition 5 When r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 < hw+hc,
a strategy prole (n3; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n3 > n
 and a widow's
payo r2 < 0.
Here, n3 satises k1   c(n3) = r2.
In this example, HIV/AIDS destroys the practice of levirate marriage owing to both mechanisms explained in
subsection 2.2.1 and subsection 2.2.3. In this case, the disappearance of levirate marriage coincides with an increase
in the number of children (i.e., n3 > n
) as well as a decrease in widows' welfare (i.e., r2 < 0).
2.3 Theoretical implication
This subsection summarizes important theoretical implications. A summary of the previous propositions are
provided in Table 1.
First, while levirate marriage can be seen as a safety net for widows (as anecdotally argued), the material
support such arrangements oer is minimal and only satises widows' subsistence needs.
Second, the disappearance of this practice may not necessarily mean that females are empowered. Given
the intricate relationship among HIV/AIDS, female empowerment, and institutional change, it is possible that the
deterioration of levirate marriage is associated with a range of (positive, negative, or no) changes in widows' welfare
and women's fertility. It is also noted that in reality, the two factors of HIV/AIDS and female empowerment could
simultaneously contribute to the disappearance of levirate marriage.
Third, in the preceding model, a husband's clan (a widow) is institutionally advantaged (disadvantaged) in
a traditional society sustaining levirate marriage. Thus, the mechanisms presented above imply that both the
positive socioeconomic shocks (e.g., female empowerment) aecting the disadvantaged group (e.g., a widow) and
negative shocks (e.g., HIV/AIDS) more pronouncedly aecting the advantaged group (e.g., a husband's clan) may
disintegrate traditional institutions, with the former increasing the disadvantaged group's welfare, and the latter
reducing the corresponding welfare.6
While the tendency of cultural institutions (i.e., the slow speed of institutional mobility) is not explicitly
modeled in this study, intuitively, it is likely that institutional change occurs more slowly in the case of female
6In empirical studies performed in the context of caste-based social networks, Luke and Munshi (2011) and Munshi and Rosenzweig
(2006) also showed that positive economic shocks (e.g., English-education opportunities, income generating opportunities) aecting
disadvantaged groups (e.g., girls, low-caste groups) could contribute to dissolving traditional institutions (e.g., caste) while improving
their welfare.
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empowerment compared with the case of HIV/AIDS, because the advantaged group that has historically beneted
from the traditional scheme may resist the transformation (e.g., Luke and Munshi, 2011; Munshi and Rosenzweig,
2006). If so, the swift deterioration of levirate marriage in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years may be compatible
with the case of HIV/AIDS.
In addition, as seen from Table 1, the sum of a clan's and a widow's equilibrium payos is the greatest at
the level of u(n)   c(n) + r1    when a widow leaves her husband's home and receives a considerable amount
of reservation utility (i.e., r = r1 > ), followed by the levirate marriage equilibrium yielding u(n
)   c(n).
Note that simply making it possible for a widow to inherit her husband's property (i.e., an increase in k) would
reduce this total welfare to the level of u(n1)  c(n1), compared with the case of the levirate marriage equilibrium.
This total welfare cannot necessarily be seen as social welfare, as it does not include the welfare accruing to a
widow's children. Nevertheless, these ndings may still suggest that the relationship between traditional institutions
violating women's human rights and social welfare is not so simple.
Admittedly, the above theoretical framework is a crude attempt to understand the practice of levirate marriage,
which has recently been disappearing in many African societies. As the mechanisms responsible for this institutional
change are empirically tested based on the theoretical predictions, it is important to ensure that factors not
considered in the model do not change the key predictions in any signicant way. As seen from the analyses
detailed in Section S.1 in the supplemental appendix, the main theoretical implications are robust to several model
extensions that consider a widow's option to leave together with her own children, uncertainty about a couple's
death, female (limited) power to control fertility (moral hazard), and so on. The analysis of female fertility control
also enables this study to consider the case that married women eventually produce no children, which is sometimes
observed in reality.
Finally, one may be inclined to model the strategy prole (n; s;m) as stipulated in a contract that a groom's
clan oers to a bride's family before a young couple starts their married life. However, this study believes that
a widow's decision to accept levirate marriage is still made after her husband's death, at least for the period
investigated. First, a widow's ex-post negotiation with a clan leader is observed in the real world. For example,
from 2013 to 2015, the author interviewed a number of rural people in Rorya, a district in the Mara region in
northeast Tanzania. Rorya is primarily settled by the Luo, an ethnic group that has received much publicity for
its practice of levirate marriage. These eld interviews revealed that widows tended to reject (accept) levirate
marriage, when their children were old (young). This is because adult children who inherit a clan's property
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can provide them with livelihood support.7 Similarly, elderly widows in Uganda also often seek protection from
their adult children, rather than entering into a relationship of levirate marriage (Ntozi, 1997).8 Nevertheless,
it is still possible to allow for such choices in the ex-ante marriage contract. However, if this approach is more
reasonable, the current practice of levirate marriage (and the associated welfare outcomes) must be characterized
by a marriage contract concluded in the past. In Africa, both HIV/AIDS and female empowerment are relatively
recent, possibly unanticipated, phenomena. Given the presumption that these factors are potentially responsible
for the deterioration of levirate marriage observed in the KHDS data, it is hard to believe that people expected
a future occurrence of these events during the time that preceded the sample periods and concluded a marriage
contract by internalizing their inuence on a bride's widowhood in future.9
[Here, Table 1]
3 An association test
Data exploited in this study is drawn from the KHDS, a longitudinal household panel survey comprising six waves,
with the rst four waves carried out between 1991 and 1994, and the remaining two waves conducted in 2004 and
2010, respectively. The empirical analysis is based on data drawn from the rst ve waves pertaining to all of the 51
KHDS villages.10 In wave 5, the survey team asked a group of village leaders whether it was common for a widow
to be inherited as a wife by the brother or other male relatives of the deceased currently, 10 years earlier, and 20
years earlier. Over 20 years, the number of villages commonly practicing levirate marriage signicantly decreased
from 31 to 17 (10 years ago) and 3 (wave 5). In this section, a strategy to explore the underlying mechanisms
responsible for the recent deterioration of levirate marriage based on this information is discussed.
7Moreover, Luo widows are relatively free to select the clan members who will inherit them and often negotiate with a clan leader
about their choice. However, this choice is still made conditional on social norms. In addition, the negotiation does not always result
in success. For example, even if widows choose a particular person as a potential inheritor, it is possible that his wife prevents him
from inheriting them.
8These ndings indicate that the strategy proles (n1; c(n1); a) and (n1; 0; z) may indeed coexist in the real world, as predicted in
proposition 2, and that the latter strategy prole may be more probable than the former when children are mature enough. Somewhat
relatedly, based on the author's aforementioned eld interviews with the Luo, a customary rule relevant to bride prices may also
encourage widows having young children to accept levirate marriage. Traditionally, receiving bride prices is a father's role and thus
widows who do not have socially recognized partners (i.e., inheritors), face diculties in marrying o their children. Therefore, when
widows have young children, they may prefer levirate marriage by internalizing the utility obtained from children's future marriage.
9To model the strategy prole (n; s;m) as the ex-ante marriage contract, one would need to consider (not only a widow's but also)
a bride's reservation utility when she rejects the marriage contract as well as inuences of the traditional safety net on bride prices
that clear marriage markets. However, it is not clear how a young, unmarried (likely HIV-negative) bride's reservation utility responds
to an unanticipated incidence of HIV/AIDS in the future. While considering the mechanisms responsible for the deterioration of
levirate marriage in a general equilibrium setting may make the theoretical predictions more robust, the subsequent empirical analysis
is performed to explore a partial equilibrium model by controlling for possible general equilibrium eects using the village-specic linear
time trends.
10More precisely, the KHDS sample covers 51 communities located in 49 villages. However, this study uses \villages" and \commu-
nities" interchangeably.
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3.1 Hypothesis building
Based on the aforementioned theoretical model, a simple way to explain why levirate marriage has been disappearing
is to estimate the (reduced-form) impacts of HIV/AIDS and female empowerment on the likelihood that a widow
enters into a levirate marriage. However, this approach cannot be adopted in the current study because the KHDS
data does not have information on widows' engagement in such traditional marriages at the individual level. To
the best of the author's knowledge, it is dicult to nd alternative data sets that provide such information (and
even the community-level prevalence of levirate marriage) that lends itself to the current empirical investigation.
As an alternative, an attempt is made to infer the underlying mechanisms from a correlation between institu-
tional change and equilibrium welfare consequences (i.e., widows' welfare and married women's fertility). According
to the propositions summarized in Table 1, the relevant equilibrium predictions are summarized in Table 2, whereby
changes in a widow's equilibrium payos and women's fertility from the levirate marriage equilibrium are denoted
as vw and n, respectively. For example, if the disappearance of levirate marriage is associated with not only
a decrease in widows' welfare but also an increase in women's fertility, which is actually the case demonstrated
in the subsequent empirical analysis, this data pattern is compatible with the view (i.e., the proposition 5) that
HIV/AIDS triggered the institutional change while establishing widows' de facto property rights.
In sum, the mechanisms driving the dissolution of levirate marriage are tested by investigating a correlation
between institutional change, as discerned from the aforementioned community-level information included in the
KHDS, and changes in welfare outcomes (i.e., consumption, fertility) recorded at the individual level. However,
exploring a simple correlation across the relevant variables is not useful, because such a correlation is attributable
to many other factors. For example, being infected with HIV/AIDS (that may correlate with the prevalence of
HIV/AIDS and therefore of levirate marriage in a community) may reduce a widow's welfare by deteriorating
her health and thus, preventing her from engaging in any income-generating activities. Or, women exposed to
urban lifestyles and values may prefer to reduce the number of children as well as to avoid the practice of levirate
marriage simply because of the preference for modernity. Therefore, the proposed testing method still requires
an appropriate strategy to identify a correlation stemming only from the mechanisms considered in the previous
theoretical analysis. This identication strategy is discussed in the following subsections. Unlike standard empirical
studies, hereinafter, it is said that the estimates are \biased" if the estimated correlation between the institutional
change and welfare outcomes arises from factors not relevant to the theoretical mechanisms that this study focuses
on.
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[Here, Table 2]
3.2 Identication strategy
3.2.1 Institutional change and widows' welfare
Pooling data pertaining to females of reproductive age (15?50) in wave 1 and wave 5 of the KHDS, this study rst
estimates the log of per capita annual consumption yijt (i.e., a household's consumption divided by the number of
its members) of a female i in a period t (wave 1 or wave 5) as11
yijt = 1 + 2Djt  wijt + 3wijt + 4xijt + vjt + ijt; (7)
whereby Djt takes the value one if levirate marriage is no longer a customary practice in a KHDS village j in the
period t; wijt is a dummy variable, equal to one if the female i is widowed in the period t and zero otherwise; the
vector xijt contains other determinants of consumption specic to the female and her household in the period t
(e.g., age, household size); vjt represents a linear time trend specic to the KHDS village j; and ijt is a stochastic
error. As noted above, existence of levirate marriage in the past is only discerned from recall information provided
by the wave 5 survey. Thus, it is assumed that the Djt takes zero in wave 1, provided that the village leaders of
the wave 5 survey had accepted that levirate marriage had commonly been practiced 10 years earlier in a surveyed
village j. Throughout the paper, the standard errors in equation (7) (and equation (8) explained below) are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered to allow for arbitrary correlations across individuals within a village.
Importantly, the coecient of interest, 2, should be interpreted as a correlation induced only by the theoretical
mechanisms that this study has in its scope (i.e., either HIV/AIDS, female empowerment, or the combination). In
fact, based on the proposition 1 in Section 2, it is likely that widows obtain reservation utility from the relationship
of levirate marriage. In this case, no causal impact of levirate marriage on widows' welfare is expected.
While the 2 should not be given a causal interpretation, as described above, it is still necessary to remove any
confounding factors that prevent this study from identifying the correlation resulting only from the aforementioned
theoretical mechanisms. For this, the specication (7) compares changes in consumption patterns of the relevant
females from wave 1 to wave 5 between villages where levirate marriage grew less customary during the sample
periods (16 villages) and all other villages (which means, dierence-in-dierences).12 Since this study exploits all
11A household's consumption includes food consumption (seasonal and non-seasonal) and non-food consumption (e.g., education
and health expenditures, miscellaneous non-food expenditures). The consumption data has been cleaned by the KHDS team and the
resulting dataset is publicly available. See Kagera Health and Development Survey   Consumption Expenditure Data for the
details at http://edi-global.com/publications/.
12More precisely, the former group consists of 16 communities located in 14 villages. See also footnote 10.
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the KHDS villages, the latter group includes those with either Djt = 0 (one village) or Djt = 1 (32 villages) in
both wave 1 and wave 5 as well as two villages with Djt = 1 in wave 1 and Djt = 0 in wave 5. While it is
possible to separate this group further, this was not done in this study to simplify the analysis. However, this
dierence-in-dierences (DID) approach is still eective, as long as the consumption patterns in these dierent
types of villages, as one group, followed a similar trend. Furthermore, by focusing on a comparison of consumption
between widows and others (which implies triple dierence), this study eliminates the inuence of time-varying
unobserved village-level characteristics that aected these villages over time in a dierent manner.
To facilitate an interpretation of the identication strategy, Figure S.3 in the supplemental appendix provides
a graphical representation of the data structure. While the KHDS is a panel survey, the above empirical approach
exploits the data as if it were pooled cross-sectional data sourced from two dierent points in time (i.e., wave 1
or wave 5). This strategy allows the current study to exploit data variations fully while avoiding the unnecessary
selection of the sample as well as the associated potential \bias." As the gure shows, in wave 1, all female
respondents resided in the KHDS villages and some of them were widowed. On the other hand, as explained in
more detail in Section 4, the wave 5 sample includes panel respondents who had moved out of the KHDS villages
between wave 1 and wave 5 as well as those that remained, each of whom consisted of widows and other females.
Dening ybefore as the dierence in consumption between widows and the remaining females in wave 1 and
yafter as the corresponding dierence between all widows and all other females in wave 5 (here, \all" means
both the migrants and non-migrants), the specication (7) compares yafter  ybefore between the villages that
made the practice of levirate marriage less common during the sample periods and the remaining villages (or triple
dierence).
Widows that were already in a levirate marriage in wave 1 are unlikely to have lost this traditional safety net
during the sample periods. Given this presumption, therefore, the meaningful 2 cannot be identied if no female
respondents became widowed between wave 1 and wave 5. Of the reproductive-age female respondents in wave 5
who were in marital relationships in wave 1, approximately 15% were widowed by wave 5, which makes this concern
less critical.
In addition, the estimations performed in this study include migrants in wave 5. Exploiting migrants in the
estimations does not necessarily invalidate the analysis. For instance, a woman who has lost her husband during
the sample periods might have left a KHDS village because his clan members did not oer levirate marriage to her.
In this example, the widow is included in the group of migrants in wave 5 and should be considered in the empirical
analysis because her welfare is greatly associated with the institutional change in the KHDS village. On the other
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hand, some migrants might have moved out of their original villages for reasons unrelated to the practice of levirate
marriage.13 Even in this case, the estimated 2 can still be interpreted as the lower bound of the correlation of
interest. Including migrants in the estimations can avoid any potential \bias" that may result from analyzing only
the data pertaining to the non-migrants in wave 5. This migration issue will also be discussed more thoroughly in
subsection S.2.1 in the supplemental appendix.
Partially related to the point of the lower bound estimate, it should also be noted that the measured institu-
tional change based on group discussions with village leaders does not necessarily mean that all local households
or individuals immediately avoided levirate marriage. Rather, it should be interpreted as reecting an average
tendency to stop the practice at the village level. In addition, by interacting Djt with wijt, the specication (7)
implicitly assumes that all widows in villages commonly practicing (not practicing) levirate marriage are (are not)
in this customary marriage-type of relationship. However, owing to the average nature of village rule, it is cer-
tainly possible that this is not the case. Thus, the assumption made here actually allows for exibility in widows'
engagement in this traditional safety net within each village which, however, is not strong enough to render the
identication strategy invalid. Furthermore, in this study, it was also dicult to exactly identify the timing of the
institutional change that occurred between wave 1 and wave 5. All these perspectives highlight the fact that the
empirical approach exploited in this study tends to attenuate the correlation that the current investigation aims
at identifying.
3.2.2 Institutional change and fertility
In its analysis of fertility, this study exploits data on reproductive-age women whose husbands are household heads,
because fertility-related information available in the data consists only of the number of a head's (biological) co-
resident children fijt. The model presented in Section 2 implicitly assumes that a clan of husbands having wives of
reproductive age chooses the number of children. Thus, the selection of this female sample as a unit of observation
is still consistent with the theoretical framework, which encourages to estimate the following empirical model
fijt = 1 +
X
k
k2 Djt  okijt +
X
k
k3  okijt + 4xijt + vjt + uijt; (8)
where okijt is an indicator that equals one if the respondent belongs to age group k and zero otherwise. The reference
group is the oldest group, i.e., those aged 41 to 50. Assuming that the disappearance of levirate marriage is indeed
13Table S.2 in the supplemental appendix reports the reasons for migration during the sample periods (in the wave 5 survey) by
panel respondents aged 15 to 50.
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associated with fertility decisions, this institutional mobility may have a more evident correlation with the number
of children born to young (thus, fecund) females. Interacting Djt with o
k
ijt enables this study to examine this
prediction while again allowing controlling for time trends specic to the original KHDS villages. As before, the
k2 represents the correlation driven by either HIV/AIDS, female empowerment, or their combination, and should
not be interpreted in a causal manner.
4 Data
The World Bank launched the KHDS in Kagera, a rural region in northwest Tanzania, as a part of a research
project on adult mortality and morbidity in 1991. The KHDS is a long-term household panel survey that includes
six waves, as of now. This survey provides a range of information related to households, as well as their members and
community, thus enabling the current study to construct unbalanced panel data at the individual level (although
as discussed in Section 3, the empirical strategy exploited in this study utilizes the data as if it were pooled
cross-sectional). The rst four waves were carried out six to seven months apart between 1991 and 1994, with the
remaining two waves taking place in 2004 and 2010, respectively. Since this project used a standardized survey
questionnaire, highly comparable information is available across the waves. This study uses the data drawn from
the rst ve waves pertaining to the panel respondents originating from all of the 51 KHDS villages. This is
because a community survey was not implemented in wave 6 and, therefore, the data set in the nal wave has no
information on local customary practices.
With stratications based on geography and mortality, the initial 912 households were randomly selected from
the 1988 Tanzanian Census. In wave 5, approximately 91% of these baseline households were re-contacted. Owing
to the long-term nature of the project, a signicant proportion of the family members surveyed earlier had moved
out of their original households/villages between wave 1 and wave 5. One of the many contributions of this
longitudinal survey was the survey team's success in tracing new households. This strenuous eort resulted in
2,719 household interviews in wave 5, including those done with the original households. Consequently, this survey
shows a signicantly low rate of sample attrition at both the individual and household levels. Excluding individuals
that died, approximately 82% of the 5,394 original respondents who were interviewed in the rst four waves were
successfully re-contacted in wave 5 (Beegle et al., 2011). The analysis in this study uses data pertaining to only
panel respondents; information on new respondents in the wave 5 survey is not exploited.
Table 3 provides a description of several variables pertaining to the sample females of reproductive age. In this
21
table, group A refers to villages that made the traditional safety net less prevalent during the sample periods (16
villages), with group B consisting of all the remaining villages, and the equality of the mean between these two
groups was checked. The study also assessed whether changes in the mean value of these variables from wave 1
to wave 5 were statistically equal between the two groups, and the DID estimates are reported in Table S.1 in
the supplemental appendix. While the mean values of several variables are signicantly dierent in the respective
waves, the DID estimates revealed few signicant dierences in the changes of all reported variables.
By controlling the village-specic linear time trend, identication of the correlation (in this study's theoretical
scope) between the institutional change and widows' consumption requires that in the absence of the deterioration
of levirate marriage, a dierence in the consumption levels between widows and the remaining females within the
same village would have followed parallel trends between the two groups A and B. A similar assumption is also
needed in estimating fertility when comparing the outcome of the young cohort with that of the elderly one. A
few of the statistically signicant DID estimates reported in Table S.1 may oer some credibility to the DID (more
precisely, triple-dierence) approach exploited in this study.
[Here, Table 3 ]
5 Empirical ndings
5.1 Widows' welfare
The estimation results of consumption are presented in Table 4. For each outcome reported in this table (and
Table 5), the analysis in the rst column controls for time-varying characteristics that aected the KHDS villages
over time in a similar manner, in addition to xed eects of the (original) KHDS villages. The estimations in
the second column additionally include regressors for age, years of living in a village, and gender of the person
responsible for providing information on customary practices in community surveys. These controls are expected to
mitigate concerns over the potential noise in the measurements of levirate marriage. In the remaining columns, the
village-xed eects and region-wise time trend exploited in the rst two columns are replaced by a village-specic
linear time trend. The inuence of changes in general marriage (and/or other) market conditions, population, and
any other factors (e.g., economic hardship, religiosity, raising awareness, legal framework) operating at the village
level can be absorbed by this time trend.
The estimated correlation between the disappearance of levirate marriage and widows' welfare displays a rela-
tively stable pattern across the columns in Table 4. First, based on the results in columns (a) to (c), on average,
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the deterioration of the traditional safety net had a negative correlation with widows' per capita consumption, but
the correlation is insignicantly dierent from zero. Applying the methodology proposed by Collier et al. (1986)
(pp. 70?73) for Tanzania, this study also estimates consumption per adult equivalent as well as that per adjusted
adult equivalent, the results of which are presented in columns (d) to (f) and (g) to (i), respectively. The former
measure reects nutritional requirements that vary by gender and age of typical individuals, whereas the latter
additionally takes into account the eects of economies of scale attributed to household size. The results suggest
that widows' consumption declined in step with the dissolution of levirate marriage.
While the statistical signicance is not always strong, the estimations in Table 4 reveal the negative relationships
between widows' consumption and the deterioration of levirate marriage. As will be discussed more carefully in
Section 6, this nding highlights the role of HIV/AIDS as a factor facilitating this institutional change. If this
infectious disease indeed plays a signicant role, this correlation is expected to be more pronounced for young
females having prime-age husbands. This is because HIV/AIDS primarily increased prime-age adult mortality in
Kagera (Beegle, 2005; Beegle et al., 2008) and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Ueyama and Yamauchi, 2009).
Based on a population-based follow-up survey that Killewo et al. (1993) conducted in Kagera in 1988, for example,
among males aged above 15 years, incidence of HIV infection was highest in the age group of 25 to 34.
To explore this possibility, this study re-estimated equation (7). While data on female respondents aged 15 to
50 were exploited in the previous estimations, the analysis here utilized dierent female samples by varying the
upper bound of respondents' age. The estimated 2 and its 95% condence interval are graphically reported in
Figure 2 (see Table S.3 in the supplemental appendix for the precise estimates).14 In this gure, the estimate
corresponding to age m in the horizontal axis stems from the regression using data pertaining to females aged 15
to m  1 years.
As the gure shows, when the upper bound on age is less than 21 years (m  21), the estimates appear to be
imprecise. This could reect the fact that only a few females are widowed in this age cohort. For example, in the
estimation using 805 females aged 15 to 20, only four respondents are widowed. However, as the estimated sample
includes females in their late-20s and early-30s (and more widows), the deterioration of levirate marriage comes to
have increasingly negative correlations with widows' consumption at conventional levels of statistical signicance.
Moreover, if data relevant to much older females are exploited in the analysis, then the estimates gradually tend
toward zero. This nding suggests that the disappearance of levirate marriage indeed relates to a decline in welfare
obtained by widows belonging to young age cohorts.15
14Instead of age-cohort dummies, these estimations exploited age and age squared as regressors.
15Figure S.4 and Figure S.5 in the supplemental appendix also report correlation of the institutional change with widows' consumptions
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[Here, Table 4 and Figure 2 ]
5.2 Fertility
Table 5 reports the estimation results of equation (8). Based on the results in columns (a) to (d), females aged
21 to 40 increased their number of children compared to those aged 41 to 50 (reference group) in association with
loss of the informal safety net. Owing to this signicant association, pooling all those aged below 41 years into one
category and estimating the same equation still yielded a signicantly positive correlation between the institutional
change and fertility in column (e).
The correlation evidently observed in that 21?40 age cohort is quite reasonable because female respondents
aged 21 to 40 in wave 5 were aged eight to 27 years in wave 1, and were likely to show higher fecundity during the
sample periods than those in any other cohorts. On the other hand, females aged below 15 (aged 41 to 50 years)
in wave 5 might have been too young (old) to adjust their number of children during the investigation period in
parallel with the dissolution of levirate marriage.
Despite the plausible empirical ndings, several concerns should be addressed. First, as the estimated outcome
is the number of children born to a household's head, the estimation results may also be consistent with the view
that in villages where the practice of levirate marriage became less common, young females who lost a husband
entered into polygynous relationships with male heads having multiple wives and thus many children. This is
possible if the traditional safety net no longer provided appropriate life protection for widows. Of the female
sample included in the estimations in Table 5, approximately 15% (4%) were in polygynous marriages in wave
1 (wave 5). However, additionally controlling for the total number of a head's wives and its interaction with a
measure of levirate marriage in column (f) in Table 5 did not aect the previous ndings.
Another concern is that the estimated number of children does not include children residing elsewhere. As
parents grow older, co-residence with their children is less likely because most adult children leave their natal home
to form their own family. Consequently, the elder cohorts of wives tend to have a smaller number of co-resident
children. The level eects from ages of a head and wives that are already included in regressors are expected to,
at least partly, control for this possibility. However, the previously identied correlation between fertility and the
deterioration of levirate marriage may still be attributed to this issue, provided that decisions relevant to children's
separation from their parents systematically dier between villages that made the practice of levirate marriage
less customary during the investigation period and all the other villages (although this study has diculty in
per adult equivalent and per adjusted adult equivalent, respectively (see Table S.3 in the supplemental appendix for the precise
estimates). The implications remain unchanged.
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enumerating the factors that encourage such a possibility).
To test the possibility that the previous estimation results are not entirely driven by this concern, this study
attempted to utilize the number of co-resident children plus children living elsewhere as a dependent variable.
However, the latter information was available only in the rst four waves of the KHDS. Therefore, alternatively,
cash and in-kind gifts that a household either received from or sent to non-household members (including children
residing elsewhere) in the last 12 months and its interactions with a measure of levirate marriage were included as
regressors in the estimations performed in column (g) in Table 5. Admittedly, this approach is not perfect enough
to control for the inuence of children living separately. Nevertheless, the key ndings are robust to the inclusion
of these additional controls.
Finally, given the presumed non-normal distribution of the fertility outcome (see Figure S.6 in the supplemental
appendix for a histogram of the number of children relevant to the observations considered in the estimations in
Table 5), the OLS estimations might not provide adequate implications. In an economic analysis of fertility,
examining the spacing of births based on a survival model is one traditional technique. However, the current
research cannot take this approach owing to the lack of relevant information. Alternatively, this study estimated
an ordered probit model in columns (h) to (j) in Table 5, which is often seen in the literature of demography.
Estimating this alternative model yields results similar to those obtained from the OLS estimations. Strictly
speaking, it is not straightforward to interpret the coecients reported in these columns because they are not
marginal eects. However, positive (negative) coecients in the ordered probit model indicate that the variables
reduce (increase) the likelihood of having no children, while raising (decreasing) the probability of having many
children. In other words, the variables characterized by the positive (negative) coecients shift the distribution
of the fertility toward the right (left). Based on these estimation results, it is likely that the disappearance of
levirate marriage positively correlates with an increase in the expected number of children born to young females,
particularly those aged 21 to 40 in wave 5.16
[Here, Table 5 ]
5.3 Threats to identication
The main nding of this present study is that the deterioration of levirate marriage is negatively associated with
young widows' consumption, while being positively correlated with the fertility of young wives (aged 21 to 40).
16The gender-based breakdown of the relationship between fertility and institutional change is reported in Table S.4 in the sup-
plemental appendix, whereby the number of sons and daughters are separately estimated in columns (a) and (b), respectively. The
analysis shows a similar magnitude for the relevant positive correlation between the groups, although it might have lost some statistical
power owing to less variation in outcomes, compared with cases estimating the total number of children in Table 5.
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While a triple-dierence approach was adopted to remove \bias" (in the context of the current study) that might
have been included in the previous estimates, such correlations may still be seen as statistical artifacts.
However, the nding that the estimated correlations are more pronounced for the young cohort is plausible,
presuming that HIV/AIDS primarily aected the young population and that young respondents show higher
fecundity. Therefore, this nding may somewhat mitigate the concern that the identied correlations are entirely
attributed to confounding factors unrelated to the theoretical mechanisms that this study focuses on. In addition,
note that the R-squared values shown in the previous estimations of consumption and fertility are relatively large.
This may suggest that there is little variation of the outcomes left to \bias" the coecients of interest (Oster,
forthcoming). Nevertheless, the detailed argument pertaining to possible identication issues is provided in Section
S.2 in the supplemental appendix, along with the relevant empirical ndings that alleviate such concerns.
6 HIV/AIDS as an agent of institutional change
The main nding of this study is compatible with the proposition 5 in Section 2 and thus highlights the importance
of HIV/AIDS in triggering institutional change. In other words, HIV/AIDS reduced widows' reservation utility
as well as established their de facto property rights, while also discouraging a husband's clan from providing this
traditional safety net.
It should also be recalled that based on the KHDS data, this centuries-long practice has started to disappear
only during the past 20 years in the area studied. As argued in subsection 2.3, this swift transformation may be
consistent with the inuence of HIV/AIDS, especially considering that in Tanzania, the rst case of AIDS was
reported in Kagera in 1983 (e.g., Ainsworth et al., 1998; Lugalla et al., 1999), and the primary purpose of the
KHDS was to examine the economic impact of prime-age adult deaths on surviving household members owing to
the high HIV infection rates in this region (e.g., Beegle, 2005; Beegle et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the aforementioned
interpretation of the estimation results requires more careful discussion, as demonstrated in this section.
6.1 Anecdotal support for the inuence of HIV/AIDS
The ndings of numerous qualitative studies support the claim that HIV/AIDS has contributed to the disappearance
of levirate marriage in Africa, as studied in Kenya (e.g., Luke, 2002; Perry et al., 2014), Uganda (e.g., Berger,
1994; Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi, 1995; Ntozi, 1997), and Zambia (e.g., Malungo, 2001). Consistent with the
assumption presented in the theoretical model in Section 2, this institutional change is taking place because both
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the inheritors and widows fear infection with HIV/AIDS stemming from practicing this customary marriage (and
the associated sexual cleansing). For instance, the author of the present study, specically for the purpose of
this research, conducted an original (cross-sectional) household survey (810 respondents) relevant to the Luo's
customary practices in Rorya, a district in the Mara region of northeast Tanzania in November?December 2015
using a structured questionnaire (recall from subsection 2.3 that the Luo is an ethnic group that traditionally
performs levirate marriage).17 In this survey, 80% (83%) of the interviewed females and 84% (90%) of their
husbands \strongly agreed" (or \agreed") to the view that levirate marriage increased the risk of people being
infected with HIV, respectively. As also seen from 4,500 interviews that Doosuur and Arome (2013) conducted
in Benue state of Nigeria, men more than women perceived the practice of levirate marriage as a mode of HIV
transmission in this region. In Zambia, a lobby group asked for legislation banning sex cleansing typically followed
by levirate marriage because of the fear of spreading HIV/AIDS (Kunda, 1995). The chiefs in Chikankata Hospital
catchment area of Zambia also enacted a law to abolish sexual cleansing in the early 1990s for a similar reason
(Malungo, 2001).
It appears that the socioeconomic consequences of the break dowm of levirate marriage prompted by HIV/AIDS
vary across societies and/or widowhood cases within a society. For example, some Luo widows in Kenya refused
levirate marriage and moved to the urban center to look for a new means of livelihood (Luke, 2002). According
to a case study of widowhood rites in Slaya district in Kenya, young widows who refrained from observing sexual
cleansing, also migrated to towns and to make ends meet, engaged in petty trade and sometimes secret sexual
liaisons (Ambasa-Shisanya, 2007). Based on the focus-group discussion facilitated by Ntozi (1997), widows' mi-
gration to other parts of the country was also observed in Uganda. Recalling the theoretical model in Section 2,
this sort of relocation of widows may be seen as a strategy l accompanied by their reservation utility r, which was
possibly lowered by HIV/AIDS.
As Mukiza-Gapere and Ntozi (1995) found in Uganda, another scenario also emerged, whereby property was
increasingly left to wives and children of the deceased, even though clan members of the deceased used to take
over the property from the widows in the past. Similarly, in present-day Zambia, family members of the deceased
are sometimes expected to provide nancial, material, and social support for the remaining widow and children,
17The target population of this survey was young married females who may be inherited by male relatives of their husbands in the
future as well as their husbands who may inherit widowed relatives in the future (or who have inherited widowed relatives). To reach
a random sample of this population, from July to September 2015, the author rst attempted to make a list of married females aged
20 to 40 residing in all the villages in Rorya. This work encouraged the survey team to actually visit 82 villages (approximately 93%
of the total villages in Rorya) based on Tanzania Population and Housing Census 2012, while enabling the team to list 9,900 eligible
females in total. In each of the 82 villages, barring one village used for training the survey enumerators, ve females and their husbands
were randomly selected from the list, yielding 405 couples individually interviewed in the household survey in the end. Before starting
this survey, the author obtained a research permit from Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) in July 2015.
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as the practice of levirate marriage is no longer oered to the widow (Malungo, 2001). This necessary care of the
remaining household members generated a long policy debate in this country, which resulted in the enactment of
the 1989 Intestate Succession Act, which allowed widows (children) to inherit 20% (50%) of property left by the
deceased. While this act may not be strictly enforced at the grassroots level in a society, these social movements
suggest that HIV/AIDS could possibly establish widows' (whether de jure or de facto) property rights (i.e., an
increase in k), which may enable them to aord many children and thus, explain why a positive correlation between
the disappearance of levirate marriage and fertility was observed in the preceding empirical analyses.18
6.2 Analyses exploiting data on HIV/AIDS
To provide further evidence of the inuence of HIV/AIDS as a factor driving the deterioration of levirate marriage,
in this subsection, additional exercises are conducted based on HIV/AIDS-related information available to the
author. In each wave of the KHDS, the survey team asked a group of village leaders about the health situation
in a community. The number of villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health
problem in a community increased from 18 in wave 1 to 32 in wave 5, with the corresponding in-between gures
summarized as 25, 24, and 35 in wave 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
While the available data is highly limited, this study also attempted to collect estimates of the biomarker-based
prevalence of HIV/AIDS from the following two information sources: 2003?04 Tanzania HIV/AIDS Indicator
Survey (2003?04 THIS) and Killewo et al. (1990). The THIS is the rst population-based comprehensive survey
carried out on HIV/AIDS in Tanzania from December 2003 to March 2004, whereas Killewo et al. (1990) estimated
the district-level infection rate based on a population-based survey conducted in Kagera in 1987. Owing to the
diculty in estimating HIV/AIDS prevalence in general, however, the estimates provided by two independent data
sources may not be temporally comparable. In addition, Killewo et al. (1990)'s estimates, which vary only by the
number of districts (six districts), also have little data variation to allow for a rigorous empirical analysis.
Nevertheless, these estimates are still useful in reecting the disease situation across space at each point in time
and thus, in assessing the accuracy of the aforementioned HIV/AIDS-related information collected in the respective
waves of the KHDS. As reported in Section S.3 in the supplemental appendix, the above subjective information in
wave 5 (wave 1 to wave 4) was consistent with the estimated disease prevalence based on the THIS (Killewo et al.,
18In addition, the socioeconomic consequences of the HIV/AIDS-induced deterioration of levirate marriage also include development
of alternative cleansing methods that do not involve sexual intercourse (e.g., Malungo, 2001), although such alternative cleansing may
not always be accepted. Moreover, in some societies, clan members of the deceased are refusing to cleanse and inherit widows, instead
handing over the task to some professional people (e.g., Ambasa-Shisanya, 2007; Luke, 2002; Nyanzi et al., 2009). It is also argued
that these professional cleansers/inheritors are spreading HIV/AIDS, as they are quite likely to be HIV positive specically owing to
this business.
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1990). This nding encouraged the current study to utilize this subjective information in the empirical analysis
that follows.19
In the current context, one way to proceed with this community-level information on HIV/AIDS collected in the
KHDS is to regress the village-level prevalence of levirate marriage (i.e., Djt) on the indicator for the villages that
identied HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in a community. The DID estimation
exploiting the village-level 102 observations (i.e., 102 = 51  2) in waves 1 and 5 as well as controlling for the
region-wise time trend and village-xed eects yielded an insignicant estimate (-0.052 with std. 0.171) suggesting
that HIV/AIDS encourages the practice of levirate marriage. However, it is dicult to interpret this estimate in
a causal manner, because the practice of levirate marriage is often blamed for facilitating the sexual transmission
of HIV/AIDS (e.g., Malungo, 2001; Okeyo and Allen, 1994).20
6.2.1 HIV/AIDS-related heterogeneity of the correlation
Alternatively, if levirate marriage has disappeared largely because of the inuence of HIV/AIDS, the previously
identied correlations between the institutional change and welfare consequences might have been more pronounced
in communities where this communicable disease had increasingly deteriorated the local health during the sample
periods.
This prediction was checked for consumption and fertility in Table 6. Of the 51 KHDS communities, 17 did
not refer to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in wave 1 but did so in wave 5.21 Of
the remaining 34 (= 51-17) communities, 31 communities did not identify HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most
important health problem in both wave 1 and wave 5, whereas the other three communities did so only in wave 1.
For each outcome and specication demonstrated in Table 6, the estimation results exploiting data relevant
to the 17 communities are reported in the rst column, whereas those in the second column are relevant to the
remaining 34 communities. First, the estimation results of consumption per capita, per adult equivalent, and per
adjusted adult equivalent are reported in columns (a) to (f) for females of reproductive age. As seen from the
results in columns (a) and (c), the negative correlation between the deterioration of levirate marriage and widows'
19The estimates provided by the THIS and Killewo et al. (1990) may also not necessarily have an advantage over this subjective
information in accurately estimating the prevalence of the disease. For example, a measurement concern still arises, because the
infection rate among those that did not test for HIV is unknown in the THIS.
20However, there is also another view that the practice of levirate marriage impedes the spread of HIV/AIDS, because the infected
widow is attached to a single inheritor and therefore, this practice contains the spread of the disease within an extended family of the
deceased (Agot, 2001; Agot et al., 2010; Luke, 2002).
21It was also possible to construct an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most important health problem in a
community. While this number was 6, 13, 8, 22, and 4 in wave 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, the decline in the number from wave
1 to wave 5 is somewhat dicult to interpret, given the likely inuence of HIV/AIDS in Kagera (e.g., Beegle, 2005; Beegle et al.,
2008). Therefore, in the analysis that follows, importance is given to the indicator for villages that identied HIV/AIDS as the most
or second-most important health problem in a community.
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welfare are more clearly observed in villages more severely aected by HIV/AIDS from 1991 (wave 1) to 2004
(wave 5). As Figure 2 showed, such a negative correlation is statistically the most distinct, if the analysis was
limited to data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to 28. In columns (k) to (p) in Table 6, the corresponding
sub-sample is exploited. Compared with the estimation results using the full-sample in columns (a) to (f), the
estimation results based on this sub-sample reveal that institutional change had a larger and statistically more
pronounced negative correlation with widows' consumption in villages, whereby HIV/AIDS increasingly produced
unfavorable consequences for the residents' health during the sample periods.
The relevant estimation results for fertility are reported in columns (g) to (j) in Table 6. In columns (g) and (i),
the reduced sample size might have made the relevant estimates somewhat imprecise in the disease-stricken areas,
as seen from the increases in the associated standard errors. In particular, of the 374 observations exploited in the
estimation of columns (g) and (i), only 9 (18) females were aged 15 to 20 in wave 1 (5). This small sample size
might by chance have made the correlation between institutional change and fertility statistically signicant in this
youngest cohort, as such a signicant correlation was not observed in this cohort in the main estimation results
presented in Table 5. Admitting this limitation, nevertheless, the magnitude of the positive correlation between
institutional change and fertility in the cohorts aged 21 to 40 is greater in the HIV-AIDS aected 17 communities
than that in the remaining communities.
[Here, Table 6 ]
6.2.2 Reduced-form impact of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare and fertility
If HIV/AIDS indeed brought about the deterioration of levirate marriage while establishing widows' de facto
property rights, it is expected that this infectious disease causally reduced widows' welfare while increasing the
number of children, as indicated in the proposition 5 in Section 2.
Accordingly, after replacing the Djt in equation (7) and (8) with an indicator for the villages that referred
to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem in a community in the respective period,
the impact of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare and parental fertility decisions are also investigated and the relevant
estimation results are reported in Table 7. This impact, obtained using the triple-dierence approach, may be seen
as reduced-form eects of HIV/AIDS, as indicated in the theoretical model in Section 2. Unlike the information on
Djt that was recalled by a group of village leaders in the wave 5 survey, the community-level information relevant
to HIV/AIDS was available in every wave of the KHDS. Therefore, in the estimations performed in Table 7, the
relevant observations recorded in all the ve waves were exploited. This treatment is expected to increase the
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precision of the estimates and power of the associated statistical test by increasing the sample size.
As the results in columns (a) to (c) show, HIV/AIDS reduced the per capita consumption of widows aged 15 to
50. However, the statistical signicance is not always strong. As recalled from the analyses conducted in subsection
5.1, the negative welfare consequence of HIV/AIDS might have been more evident for widows belonging to a young
age cohort. Taking a similar approach to that for the estimations performed in Figure 2, the impact of HIV/AIDS
on consumption was estimated for females aged 15 to m  1 (m  16), and the relevant estimates are reported in
Figure 3 with 95% condence intervals (see Table S.5 in the supplemental appendix for the precise estimates).22
As the results show, HIV/AIDS reduced the consumption of young widows, and the magnitude and statistical
signicance of the impact was more pronounced for widows aged 15 to 28. This nding is consistent with the fact
that the negative correlation between institutional change and widows' welfare is more clearly observed for widows
belonging to this particular age cohort, as seen in Figure 2.23
The impacts of HIV/AIDS on fertility are reported in columns (d) through (f) in Table 7 and the result suggests
that females aged 21 to 40 increased their number of children during the sample periods as a result of this infectious
disease than those aged 41 to 50 (reference group) did. Compared with those belonging to any other cohorts, females
aged 21 to 40 in wave 5 were aged 8 to 27 years in wave 1 and thus, must have revealed great fecundity during the
investigation period. Accordingly, the marked fertility response of this age cohort is quite reasonable. Moreover,
this age cohort is exactly the same as the cohort in which the statistically signicant positive correlation between
the deterioration of levirate marriage and fertility were more pronouncedly observed in Table 5.24
Strictly speaking, the above estimates may not be seen as true causal eects, if HIV/AIDS aects the likelihood
of being widowed or in young age cohorts. To evaluate the importance of omitted variables (required to explain
the above HIV/AIDS impact) that share covariance properties with the observed controls, this study calculated
a coecient of proportionality on selection assumptions , developed in Oster (forthcoming). The  > 1 suggests
that the unobservables are more important than the observables. The negative  value indicates that inclusion of
the unobserved controls in regressors increases the magnitude of the estimated eect, rather than absorbing the
size of the eect.
22Similar to the estimations reported in Figure 2, age and age squared are exploited as regressors in these estimations, instead of
age-cohort dummies.
23With 95% condence intervals, Figure S.7 and Figure S.8 in the supplemental appendix also present the estimated eects of
HIV/AIDS on consumption per adult equivalent and per adjusted adult equivalent, respectively (see Table S.5 in the supplemental
appendix for the precise estimates). The implications are similar to those provided by Figure 3.
24Remember that the community-level prevalence of levirate marriage in wave 1 (i.e., Djt) was estimated based on recall information
provided by the wave 5 survey, whereas information on the measured prevalence of HIV/AIDS (i.e., indicator) was collected in all
the waves of the KHDS. As detailed in Section S.3 in the supplemental appendix, the HIV/AIDS-relevant information in wave 1 was
consistent with objective infection rates sourced from Killewo et al. (1990). Therefore, the remarkably similar heterogeneity based on
respondents' age between Figure 2 and Figure 3 (for consumption) as well as between Table 5 and column (d) through (f) in Table 7
(for fertility) may mitigate a concern over measurement noise pertaining to the recalled prevalence of levirate marriage in wave 1.
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When estimating the , it is important to utilize the value of R-squared obtained from a hypothetical regression
of the outcome on the treatment, observed, and unobserved controls, denoted as Rmax. This study attempted
two values of Rmax. Regarding the value of R-squared resulting from a regression on the treatment and observed
controls as ~R, Oster (forthcoming) heuristically suggested Rmax = 1:3 ~R. Consequently, this study rst exploited
1:3 ~R as the Rmax estimate for each value of R-squared corresponding to the estimation results presented in Table
7. In addition, Rmax = 1 was also utilized as the least conservative value. As all the  values (relevant to the
coecients on the interaction term between an indicator for widows or a cohort aged 20 to 41 and an indicator for
HIV/AIDS-aected communities) reported at the bottom of Table 7 were negative, the aforementioned HIV/AIDS
impact appears to be attenuated if any bias exists. This nding keeps the interpretation that this communicable
disease decreased widows' consumption and encouraged the fertility of young wives.
This attenuation is plausible. For example, if relatively wealthy wives (whose husbands are active in the dating
market or engage in polygyny) lost their husbands to HIV/AIDS in the disease-stricken areas, the aforementioned
negative impact on widow's welfare would be biased upward. In addition, young women might have lost prime-age
husbands (that were active in the dating market) in the HIV/AIDS-aected areas. Since the analysis of fertility
limits attention to data on females whose husbands are alive and household heads, this study might have underes-
timated the number of children born to young, fecund wives in the disease-prone areas, while underestimating the
positive fertility eects of HIV/AIDS in the young cohort.
[Here, Table 7 and Figure 3]
6.3 Alternative interpretation
Each of the main ndings of this study, i.e., negative (positive) association of the disappearance of levirate marriage
with young widows' welfare (young wives' fertility), may make sense on its own, if the causal interpretation is given
to such relationships. First, widows might actually have lost welfare owing to the deterioration of the informal
insurance that had beneted them previously. Second, given the ndings that an investment in childbearing is
considered an important strategy for young women to protect them in their old age in agrarian societies (e.g.,
Hoddinott, 1992; Jensen, 1990; Nugent, 1985; Nugent and Gillaspy, 1983), this institutional change might have
encouraged a young woman to have more children, given the possibility that female (reproductive) rights are not
entirely suppressed within a family. This is because children may protect her in the future instead of the traditional
safety net.
However, if women had indeed previously gained from the practice of levirate marriage, it is necessary to explain
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why they agreed to stop this practice. One possibility is that since women found a better way to make a livelihood
outside this customary marriage, they lost an interest in welfare services provided by levirate marriage. In this case,
however, there is no theoretical reason to expect that young women attempt to increase the number of children.
Alternatively, women could not resist the loss of the informal insurance, because they did not have a powerful
voice in any matter to do with their husbands' families. In this case, it is less likely that married women had
strong bargaining power over fertility decisions and that the positive fertility eect resulted from their behavioral
response to protect their widowhood.
To increase the number of children, it may still be possible that married women reduced their use of concealable
contraception in response to institutional change (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2014). Despite considerable increases in the
use of injectables and pills for the period of 1991?2004, however, the respective prevalence rates were just 8.3%
and 5.9% among married women in 2004?2005 (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) [Tanzania] and ORC Macro,
2005, p. 74), and access to family planning was still limited, particularly in rural areas.2526
Since widows' engagement in levirate marriage is not observed at the individual level in the KHDS data, in
the current study, an attempt is made to infer the mechanisms underlying the deterioration of levirate marriage
by testing multiple theoretical predictions. To refute the interpretation of the mechanisms alleged in this study,
alternative hypotheses would have to simultaneously explain why the dissolution of levirate marriage had a negative
correlation with young widows' consumption; why this institutional change positively correlated with fertility of
young wives (aged 20 to 41); why these correlations are more pronounced in HIV/AIDS-aected communities; why
HIV/AIDS reduced young widows' consumption; why HIV/AIDS encouraged the fertility of young wives (aged
20 to 41); and most importantly, why levirate marriage is fast disappearing. The author acknowledges that the
fertility response to HIV/AIDS may result from other channels not considered in this study, given the mixed
evidence provided by previous studies.27 Nevertheless, the empirical exploration of widows' welfare is still helpful
25The corresponding rate of male condom use was approximately 2.0% (3.0%) among the currently married women (all women).
26Related to this concern, additional exercises conducted in Table S.6 in the supplemental appendix provided no evidence suggesting
that married women's bargaining power increased as a result of institutional change. In these exercises, this study replaced fijt in
equation (8) with a proportion of mother-related expenditures relative to a household's total expenditures and estimated the equation
with or without additional control of the total expenditures. Three dierent types of mother-related expenditures were attempted,
namely just jewelry and perfume, additionally expenditures on fabric, clothing, and shoes, and further, expenditures on children's
education.
27In addition to the possible physiological eects, negative fertility response is possible owing to several behavioral reasons. According
to Young (2005), for instance, HIV/AIDS reduces fertility, because people may hesitate to engage in unprotected sex to avoid contracting
this communicable disease and/or the spread of HIV/AIDS may increase the perceived value of women in labor markets by contributing
to the scarcity of labor force. The behavioral response to avoid risky sexual intercourse may also be aected by people's life expectancy
unrelated to HIV/AIDS (Oster, 2012) and/or knowledge of their sero-status (Gong, 2015; Thornton, 2008). The perceived risk of
HIV/AIDS may also alter the relational type of sexual partners (casual or committed) while aecting the likelihood of early fertility
(Duo et al., 2015). In addition, HIV-positive parents may also dislike having sero-positive babies that would die in early infancy
(Grieser et al., 2001) as well as (if they altruistic) avoid leaving many children orphaned. On the other hand, an increasing risk of
mortality may encourage parents to have more children for a precautionary purpose and/or owing to a quantity-quality trade-o of
childbearing (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan, 2003; Soares, 2005), for example. Furthermore, it is also possible that any fertility response arises
from people's beliefs about the relationship between childbirth and AIDS that may not necessarily be correct (e.g., Yeatman, 2011).
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in interpreting mechanisms responsible for the disappearance of levirate marriage, because likely, a husband's clan
always attempts to keep a widow's equilibrium payo at the minimum. In the absence of strong candidates for an
alternate hypothesis, all the relevant results demonstrated in this study may collectively provide support for the
claim that a primary factor responsible for the deterioration of levirate marriage is HIV/AIDS. This claim is also
consistent with the ndings of numerous qualitative studies.
7 Conclusion
While levirate marriage has customarily been practiced in many societies in sub-Saharan Africa, this practice is
fast disappearing. Since this practice has anecdotally been viewed as an informal safety net for widows with limited
rights to property, it is expected that this social change will signicantly aect economic development. Despite
this potential inuence, however, this traditional marriage practice has, thus far, not been a subject of economic
research. To ll this knowledge gap, this study examines why this practice is disappearing in this region.
To empirically address the question, this study rst developed a simple theoretical model that explained the
mechanisms maintaining levirate marriage based on the ndings provided by relevant anthropological and ethno-
graphic studies as well as the author's eld surveys in the Kagera and Mara regions in Tanzania. Then, the two
mechanisms of female empowerment and HIV/AIDS were analyzed, both of which could possibly have triggered
deterioration of this customary practice. The theoretical analysis predicted that widows' welfare was more likely
to decline (increase) in step with the dissolution of levirate marriage owing to HIV/AIDS (female empowerment).
By exploiting one novel setting observed in the survey data collected in rural Tanzania for 1991?2004, this
theoretical prediction was assessed; during this period, this customary marriage practice became less common in
several communities. Using a triple-dierence approach, it was found that this institutional change was negatively
associated with young widows' consumption while positively correlated with the fertility of young wives. These
correlations were also more evident in villages where HIV/AIDS increasingly deteriorated local health conditions
during the sample periods. It was also found that this communicable disease reduced young widows' consumption
as well as encouraged fertility of young wives, arguably in a causal manner. All these ndings are consistent with
the view that HIV/AIDS is primarily responsible for the recent disappearance of levirate marriage in sub-Saharan
Africa; at the very least, it is dicult for female empowerment alone to explain this institutional change.
The implication of the present investigation serves as an important caution for those who propose an outright
ban on an anti-social practice that is seen as violating women's human rights and who interpret the disappearance
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of levirate marriage as a sign of female empowerment. As a result of HIV/AIDS, young widows may need a form of
social protection (e.g., formal insurance, access to income-generating opportunities). As indicated in the theoretical
model presented in Section 2 (see also Table 1), providing such protection (i.e., an increase in r > ) may also
improve the total welfare enjoyed by a clan and by widows.
In this study, an attempt is made to speculate about the underlying mechanisms based on the theoretically
expected correlations between the deterioration of levirate marriage and welfare changes. This attempt was needed
because in the absence of individual-level information relevant to widows' engagement in levirate marriage, causally
identifying the reduced-form impact on traditional marriage was not possible.28
On the one hand, developing the relevant testing strategy despite the lack of such crucial information may be
seen as one contribution of the present paper, given that there is little empirical evidence of this marriage practice.
Indeed, exploitation of the data drawn from the KHDS makes the empirical analyses and ndings presented in this
study invaluable. This is because empirical research of the kind presented here requires not only a setting, where
the practice of levirate marriage is deteriorating, but also panel data that \records" the institutional transformation
in the \long term." Collecting information on levirate marriage is extremely unusual (even if it is at the community-
level) in standard household surveys, much less in the long term. On the other hand, owing to the absence of solid
data, it is still dicult to prove or disprove the plausibility of the asserted mechanisms in a strict sense. As another
contribution, however, the theoretical propositions demonstrated in this paper would still be helpful in providing
testable hypotheses for future relevant studies. Along with such studies, the current research must improve the
general understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the transformation of cultural institutions that have been
rooted in societies.
Last but not the least, in the developing world, informal institutions (e.g., informal insurance arrangements)
play a signicant socioeconomic role by supplementing weak formal institutions. Nevertheless, according to Greif
and Iyigun (2013), \social institutions are ... all but absent from our analyses of economic growth and development"
possibly (in part) because of the limited availability of appropriate data. In addition, in such a region, infectious
diseases (e.g., Ebola, HIV/AIDS, malaria) tend to strike an economy, and their unfavorable welfare consequences
are often aggravated by a poor formal health system. Considering these issues, this study may provide a valuable
lesson applicable in other development settings, particularly when considering the vulnerability or resistance of
non-market institutions to deadly communicable diseases.
28Even if such information had been available, it might also have been dicult to identify the relevant causal eects, given the
possible impact of levirate marriage on the spread of HIV/AIDS (Agot, 2001; Agot et al., 2010; Luke, 2002; Malungo, 2001; Okeyo and
Allen, 1994) as well as diculty in nding an appropriate instrumental variable.
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Table 1: Summary of the propositions
Proposition Strategy prole Fertility A clan's payos A widow's payos
at equilibrium at equilibrium at equilibrium at equilibrium
1. Levirate marriage (n; c(n); a) n u(n)  c(n) r0 = 0
2. Female empowerment (k ") (n1; c(n1); a) or (n1; 0; z) n1 > n u(n1)  c(n1) r0 = 0
3. Female empowerment (r ")
  r1 (n; c(n) + r1; a) n u(n)  c(n)  r1 r1 > 0
 < r1 (n
; 0; l) n u(n)  c(n)   r1 > 0
4. HIV/AIDS
   (n0; 0; z) n0  n u(n0)  c(n0) r0 = 0
 <  (n; 0; l) n u(n)  c(n)   r0 = 0
5. HIV/AIDS-induced (n3; 0; z) n3 > n
 u(n3)  c(n3)  r2 r2 < 0
female empowerment (k " & r #)
Note:   u(n)  c(n)  u(n0) + c(n0).
Table 2: Relationship with the deterioration of levirate marriage
A change in a widow's A change in fertility Underlying mechanisms
payos at equilibrium at equilibrium (proposition)
vw > 0 n > 0 Not possible
n = 0 3. Female empowerment (r ")
n < 0 Not possible
vw = 0 n > 0 2. Female empowerment (k ")
n = 0 4. HIV/AIDS ( <  &   )
n < 0 4. HIV/AIDS (  )
vw < 0 n > 0 5. HIV/AIDS-induced female empowerment (k " & r #)
n = 0 Not possible
n < 0 Not possible
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Table 3: Summary statistics (females aged 15 to 50 years)
Group A Group B
Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of
obs. obs.
(A) Wave 1
Per capita consumption (TSH) 53517.16 45253.82 400 52812.96 35915.54 800
No. of biological children 2.63** 2.66 402 2.28 2.23 802
No. of biological sons 1.28** 1.37 402 1.11 1.32 802
No. of biological daughters 1.35* 1.76 402 1.16 1.34 802
Education (years) 4.55** 3.31 394 5.05 3.06 786
Widow (dummy) 0.08 0.28 402 0.10 0.30 802
Age (years) 27.07 9.80 402 27.46 10.42 802
Head's age (years) 46.10* 16.03 402 47.90 16.16 802
Head male (dummy) 0.78* 0.41 402 0.73 0.43 802
HH size 7.70 5.14 400 7.33 3.07 800
HH land (acre) 6.67*** 6.70 388 5.19 4.78 793
(B) Wave 5
Per capita consumption (TSH) 48143.06*** 39185.11 526 58488.4 54943.67 1190
No. of biological children 2.32*** 2.22 526 1.82 1.72 1190
No. of biological sons 1.15*** 1.37 526 0.88 1.06 1190
No. of biological daughters 1.17*** 1.41 526 0.94 1.14 1190
Education (years) 5.18*** 3.37 524 5.89 3.14 1171
Widow (dummy) 0.05 0.22 524 0.05 0.22 1189
Age (years) 27.89** 9.20 526 26.80 8.56 1190
Head's age (years) 41.67 14.99 525 42.35 15.48 1180
Head male (dummy) 0.80*** 0.40 525 0.69 0.45 1180
HH size 5.97*** 3.59 526 5.39 2.63 1190
HH land (acre) 4.50** 4.63 468 3.86 4.12 1008
Note: In each wave, the equality of means between the group A and group B is examined. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%,
and * at 10%.
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Table 4: Institutional change and widows' welfare (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of consumption per Log of consumption per Log of consumption per
capita (TSH) adult equivalent (TSH) adjusted adult equivalent (TSH)
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
No levirate marriage
 Widow -0.054 -0.066 -0.044 -0.116 -0.129 -0.102 -0.187 -0.202* -0.195*
(0.095) (0.093) (0.075) (0.094) (0.092) (0.074) (0.118) (0.116) (0.106)
No levirate marriage -0.020 -0.023 - -0.031 -0.041 - -0.026 -0.046 -
(0.082) (0.077) (0.082) (0.078) (0.097) (0.092)
Widow -0.075 -0.062 -0.090 -0.024 -0.011 -0.043 0.096 0.107 0.103
(0.089) (0.088) (0.071) (0.087) (0.086) (0.068) (0.102) (0.100) (0.086)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.134*** -0.137*** -0.147*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.125*** -0.151*** -0.151*** -0.164***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.204*** -0.054 -0.058 -0.076* 0.039 0.035 0.012
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
Aged 31 to 40 -0.160*** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.081** -0.087** -0.087** 0.084* 0.078* 0.065
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Education (years) 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Head's age (years) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head male 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.027 0.027 0.032
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
HH size -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.132***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
HH land (acre) 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village leader char. NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
Village FE YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO
Region-time trend YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO
Village-time trend NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
R-squared 0.330 0.335 0.370 0.315 0.320 0.357 0.462 0.466 0.489
No. of obs. 2616 2564 2616 2616 2564 2616 2616 2564 2616
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table 5: Institutional change and fertility
Dependent variable: No. of children
Sample: Head's wives aged 15 to 50
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Ordered Ordered Ordered
probit probit probit
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 0.002 -0.052 0.052 0.056 - 0.044 -0.080 -0.102 -0.100 -
(0.322) (0.331) (0.351) (0.350) (0.352) (0.366) (0.313) (0.313)
 Aged 21 to 30 0.524** 0.469* 0.444 - - 0.436 0.371 0.403* - -
(0.246) (0.265) (0.273) (0.271) (0.279) (0.244)
 Aged 31 to 40 0.642* 0.607* 0.719* - - 0.710* 0.692* 0.643** - -
(0.323) (0.337) (0.368) (0.384) (0.363) (0.299)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - 0.561* - - - - 0.504** -
(0.293) (0.253)
 Aged 15 to 40 - - - - 0.482* - - - - 0.419*
(0.277) (0.238)
 No. of a head's wives - - - - - 0.015 - - - -
(0.490)
 HH's cash and in-kind gifts - - - - - - 0.014*** - - -
received (10 3) (0.004)
 HH's cash and in-kind gifts - - - - - - -0.010** - - -
sent (10 3) (0.004)
No levirate marriage -0.479* -0.452 - - - - - - - -
(0.270) (0.279)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.380 -0.375 -0.416 -0.419 -0.743** -0.400 -0.331 -0.450 -0.452 -0.838***
(0.351) (0.358) (0.382) (0.382) (0.348) (0.380) (0.400) (0.335) (0.335) (0.299)
Aged 21 to 30 0.299 0.314 0.342 0.245 0.311 0.356 0.381 0.371 0.285 0.356
(0.242) (0.250) (0.268) (0.294) (0.281) (0.265) (0.277) (0.231) (0.241) (0.229)
Aged 31 to 40 0.605** 0.607* 0.479 0.604** 0.665** 0.490 0.455 0.483* 0.592** 0.655***
(0.295) (0.312) (0.356) (0.292) (0.279) (0.375) (0.352) (0.268) (0.233) (0.220)
Education (years) -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Head's age (years) -0.010 -0.011* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010 -0.009* -0.009* -0.009*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Head male -0.444 -0.472 -0.352 -0.342 -0.301 -0.361 -0.312 -0.177 -0.167 -0.128
(0.435) (0.468) (0.542) (0.533) (0.586) (0.550) (0.496) (0.715) (0.709) (0.754)
HH size 0.553*** 0.552*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.554*** 0.556*** 0.560*** 0.506*** 0.505*** 0.504***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
HH land (acre) 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
No. of a head's wives - - - - - -0.040 - - - -
(0.271)
HH's cash and in-kind gifts - - - - - - -0.013*** - - -
received (10 3) (0.004)
HH's cash and in-kind gifts - - - - - - 0.006*** - - -
sent (10 3) (0.002)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village leader char. NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Village FE YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Region-time trend YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Village-time trend NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.716 0.722 0.730 0.730 0.729 0.730 0.732 0.290 0.289 0.288
No. of obs. 1217 1191 1217 1217 1217 1217 1201 1217 1217 1217
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table 6: HIV/AIDS-related heterogeneity: institutional change and welfare outcomes (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of consumption (TSH) per No. of children
capita adult equivalent adusted adult equivalent
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50 Females aged 15 to 50 Head's wives aged 15 to 50
Did HIV/AIDS become a YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
more important health
problem from wave 1 to 5?
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
No levirate marriage
 widow -0.201** 0.026 -0.194** -0.059 -0.102 -0.220 - - - -
(0.083) (0.091) (0.079) (0.093) (0.165) (0.131)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - - - - - 1.662* -0.298 1.658* -0.297
(0.925) (0.344) (0.918) (0.343)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - - - - - 0.720 0.329 - -
(1.006) (0.278)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - - - - - 1.182 0.607 - -
(1.281) (0.362)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - - - - - - 0.950 0.438
(1.090) (0.287)
R-squared 0.310 0.402 0.299 0.389 0.460 0.507 0.701 0.745 0.700 0.744
No. of obs. 867 1749 867 1749 867 1749 374 843 374 843
Sample: Females aged 15 to 28 Females aged 15 to 28 Females aged 15 to 28
Did HIV/AIDS become a YES NO YES NO YES NO
more important health
problem from wave 1 to 5?
(k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
No levirate marriage
 widow -1.135*** -0.213 -1.285*** -0.210 -1.894*** -0.171
(0.249) (0.147) (0.226) (0.149) (0.258) (0.222)
R-squared 0.355 0.417 0.355 0.405 0.507 0.537
No. of obs. 520 1033 520 1033 520 1033
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) Individual controls include all regressors used in the analysis in
Table 4 and Table 5, but the corresponding estimates are not reported here.
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Table 7: Reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare and fertility (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of consumption (TSH) per No. of children
capita adult equivalent adjusted adult
equivalent
Sample: Females Females Females Head's wives aged 15 o 50
aged 15 to 50 aged 15 to 50 aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
One if HIV/AIDS is the most or second most important health problem in a community
 Widow -0.040 -0.048 -0.148* - - -
(0.055) (0.054) (0.079)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - - -0.155 -0.150 -
(0.363) (0.363)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - - 0.348* - -
(0.183)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - - 0.518** - -
(0.223)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - - 0.425** 0.476***
(0.192) (0.149)
Widow -0.145*** -0.142*** 0.001 - - -
(0.046) (0.046) (0.058)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.175*** -0.159*** -0.167*** -0.534* -0.539* -0.605**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.308) (0.308) (0.270)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.209*** -0.101*** 0.010 0.407** 0.367** 0.344**
(0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.166) (0.166) (0.157)
Aged 31 to 40 -0.176*** -0.111*** 0.065* 0.807*** 0.851*** 0.829***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.036) (0.186) (0.180) (0.163)
Education (years) 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Head's age (years) 0.001 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Head male 0.131*** 0.116*** 0.018 -0.616 -0.637 -0.606
(0.033) (0.034) (0.042) (0.445) (0.457) (0.462)
HH size -0.047*** -0.041*** -0.116*** 0.531*** 0.530*** 0.530***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
HH land (acre) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Oster (forthcoming)'s 
(1) Rmax = 1:3 ~R -2.088 -3.294 -1.637 - -1.299 -1.323
(2) Rmax = 1:0 -0.372 -0.574 -0.576 - -1.080 -1.104
R-squared 0.365 0.357 0.514 0.731 0.731 0.731
No. of obs. 5688 5688 5688 2327 2327 2327
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
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vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  s
vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n)
vc(n; s; k) = u(n)  k
vw(n; s; k) = k   c(n)
vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)  
vw(n; s; l) = r
c Choose the number of children (n)
c
w
Choose an amount of livelihood support s  0 under levirate marriage
s > 0: oer levirate marriage.
s = 0: not oer levirate marriage.
Accept
(a)
Inherit and stay
(z)
Leave (alone)
(l)
Figure 1: Game tree
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Figure 2: Age heterogeneity: institutional change and widows' welfare (consumption per capita) (OLS)
Notes: (1) This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the
respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to
m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported in more detail in Table S.3 in the supplemental appendix.
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Figure 3: Age heterogeneity: reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (consumption per capita)
(OLS)
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that
the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported
in more detail in Table S.5 in the supplemental appendix.
50
Supplemental appendix
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S.1 Robustness to model extension
In this section, an attempt is made to ensure that the key theoretical implications are robust to several model
extensions.
S.1.1 Relocation cost and punishment
In the real world, several additional costs aect players' payos, which can easily be considered in the model. For
example, it is possible to include the cost that may be imposed by community members on widows not following
the traditional custom. Similarly, a widow's relocation cost associated with the action l can also be analyzed in the
model. However, inclusion of these additional costs would not change the model predictions, because these costs
only reduce widows' reservation utility.
S.1.2 A widow's option to leave with her own children
In this subsection, a widow's choice to leave with her own children is additionally included in her action set, namely,
a widow may leave alone (m = action l1) or leave with her own children (m = action l2). Presuming that a widow
taking the action l2 (or her parents) usually has to return bridewealth payments (given at the time of marriage
from a groom to a bride's family) to the clan, the relevant payo proles can be summarized as
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  s; (S.1.1)
vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n); (S.1.2)
vc(n; s; l1) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (S.1.3)
vw(n; s; l1) = r   g; (S.1.4)
vc(n; s; l2) = b; (S.1.5)
vw(n; s; l2) = r   c(n)  b; (S.1.6)
vc(n; s; z) = u(n)  k; (S.1.7)
vw(n; s; z) = k   c(n); (S.1.8)
whereby b  0 is bridewealth payments and g  0 is the cost borne by widows leaving alone (e.g., emotional cost
arising from separation from children), both of which are assumed to be exogenously determined.29 As seen from
29As the amount of bride price is agreed on at the time of marriage, it is pre-determined when this extensive-form game begins.
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the payo proles, when a widow leaves with her own children, she has to repay bride prices to the clan, which
benets a clan but is detrimental to the widow. In addition, when a widow leaves alone, she bears the separation
cost. To allow for the case that a widow prefers to leave with her children to leaving alone, it is assumed that the
separation cost is reasonably large, i.e., g  b.
However, note that when widows' independent livelihood means are limited (i.e., r  0) (and given k  0), a
widow never chooses the action l2. This is because a widow prefers to exploit her husband's property (bequeathed to
her or her children), rather than starting a new life with children taken away from a husband's family (i.e., r c(n) b
< k   c(n)). Therefore, this observation makes the theoretical analysis of the present concern fundamentally the
same as that considered in the benchmark model.
Consequently, when widows have limited independent livelihood means so that r = r0 = 0 and k = k^0 
c(n)  g, it turns out that
Proposition S.1 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k^0  c(n)   g, the strategy prole (n; c(n)   g; a) is subgame
perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0   g =  g.
In addition, assume that HIV/AIDS strikes a society sustaining the traditional marriage practice, while estab-
lishing widows' de facto property rights k = k^1 > c(n
)   g as well as reducing r to the level of r2 < 0. Now,
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  s  hc and vw(n; s; a) = s  c(n)  hw. Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition S.2 When r = r2 < 0, k = k^1 > c(n
)  g, and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2 + g
< hw + hc, the strategy prole (n^1; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n^1 > n

and a widow's payo r2   g <  g.
Here, n^1 satises k^1   c(n^1) = r2   g.
In the case of HIV/AIDS-induced female empowerment, the deterioration of levirate marriage is associated with
an increase in the number of children (i.e., n^1 > n
) as well as a decline in widows' welfare (i.e., r2   g <  g),
which is a similar nding to that obtained from analyses of the benchmark model.
S.1.3 Uncertainty about a couple's death
While it was presumed in the benchmark model that a husband surely dies before a wife does, this assumption is
relaxed in this subsection, as it is possible that this is not the case in the real world. Dening a probability that a
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husband's dies rst as p 2 (0; 1), the agents' expected payos can be characterized as
vc(n; s; a) = u(n)  ps  (1  p)(c(n) + ); (S.1.9)
vw(n; s; a) = p(s  c(n)); (S.1.10)
vc(n; s; l) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (S.1.11)
vw(n; s; l) = pr; (S.1.12)
vc(n; s; z) = u(n)  pk   (1  p)(c(n) + ); (S.1.13)
vw(n; s; z) = p(k   c(n)); (S.1.14)
whereby it is assumed that when a wife dies rst, a husband's clan will take care of the children left behind.
First, consider a case that widows have limited independent livelihood means so that r = r0 = 0 and k = k0 
c(n). Then, it is easy to show that
Proposition S.3 When r = r0 = 0 and k = k0  c(n), the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect, along
with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo pr0 = 0.
Next, assume that HIV/AIDS hits a society that practices levirate marriage, while establishing widows' de facto
property rights k = k1 > c(n
) as well as reducing r to the level of r2 < 0. Now, vc(n; s; a) = u(n)   ps   (1  
p)(c(n) + )  phc and vw(n; s; a) = p(s  c(n)  hw). Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition S.4 Assume that r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2
< hw + hc. Then,
1. When k1  c(np) + r2 (in this case, n < n3  np), the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along
with the equilibrium number of children n3 > n
 and a widow's payo pr2 < 0 (Case 1).
2. When c(np) + r2 < k1 < c(np) (in this case, n
  np < n3), the strategy prole (np; 0; z) is subgame perfect,
along with the equilibrium number of children np  n and a widow's payo p(k1   c(np)) < 0 (Case 2).
3. When k1  c(np) (in this case, n  np < n3), the strategy prole (np; 0; z) is subgame perfect, along with
the equilibrium number of children np  n and a widow's a payo p(k1   c(np))  0 (Case 3).
Here, np satises u
0(np) = (1  p)c0(np).
When there is a possibility that a wife dies rst, the disappearance of levirate marriage coincides with an increase
in the number of children (i.e., n3 > n
 or np  n) as well as either a decrease or increase in widows' welfare. The
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possible increase in widows' welfare (i.e., Case 3) is a prediction that was not provided in the benchmark model.
Several points deserve highlighting.
First, as the likelihood that a husband dies rst goes up, np increases.
30 Then, given the values of r0 (= 0),
r2, and k1, Case 1 (i.e., c(n
) < k1  c(np) + r2) is more likely to occur, as p increases. Consequently, when the
value of p is large, the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) would arise at equilibrium. In fact, this is exactly the equilibrium
strategy prole achieved when a husband surely dies rst, as seen from proposition 5.
Second, as discussed in subsection 2.2.1, an increase in the amount of a husband's property bequeathed to widows
(or their children) provides a clan with an incentive to increase the number of ospring, because widows can now
aord many children when choosing action z. However, when the probability that a husband dies rst decreases
(i.e., small p), which tends to result in Case 2 or Case 3 because of the decreasing np (i.e., k1 > c(np) + r2),
31 a
clan's expected cost of taking care of children left by a wife (that dies rst) would increase. Owing to this increase
in the expected child-rearing cost, a clan would hesitate to increase the number of children to the level of n3 and
eventually choose np < n3. In this case, it is possible that widows' welfare increases (i.e., Case 3) as a result of
HIV/AIDS, if they can inherit a signicant amount of a husband's property (i.e., k1  c(np)). Otherwise (i.e., k1
< c(np)), widows' welfare decreases (i.e., Case 2).
Third, even if uncertainty exists about a couple's death, widows' welfare would still decline and the number of
children would increase, as long as a husband is more likely to die rst (i.e., Case 1) and the amount of bequest
provided for widows is not large (i.e., Case 2), both of which seem to be the case in reality.
S.1.4 Female fertility control: Moral hazard
In the benchmark model, a husband's clan had a deterministic inuence on the number of children. However, it
may be more realistic to assume that married women can also inuence their fertility, which is what is considered
in this subsection.
Now, assume that during her married life, a woman can either expend eort e, which is unobserved by a
husband's clan, to produce children or not. If such eort is expended (e = e), n children would be produced with
certainty, otherwise (e = e) with probability q 2 (0; 1), where the cost of fertility eort is denoted as d > 0. The
strategy prole now includes women's fertility eort, as characterized by (n; s;m; e). Then, a clan's and a widow's
30This means that if p1 > p2, n1p > n
2
p, whereby u
0(n1p) = (1  p1)c0(n1p) and u0(n2p) = (1  p2)c0(n2p). This can be proved as follows;
suppose n1p  n2p when p1 > p2, c0(n1p)  c0(n2p), which results in (1   p1)c0(n1p)  (1   p1)c0(n2p) < (1   p2)c0(n2p) and so, u0(n1p) <
u0(n2p). This implies that n1p > n2p, which is a contradiction of n1p  n2p.
31For example, when p  0, n  np and so, c(np) + r2  c(n) + r2 < c(n) < k1.
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payos can be written as
vc(n; s; a; e) = u(n)  s; (S.1.15)
vc(n; s; a; e) = q(u(n)  s); (S.1.16)
vw(n; s; a; e) = s  c(n)  d; (S.1.17)
vw(n; s; a; e) = q(s  c(n)) + (1  q)r; (S.1.18)
vc(n; s; l; e) = u(n)  c(n)  ; (S.1.19)
vc(n; s; l; e) = q(u(n)  c(n)  ); (S.1.20)
vw(n; s; l; e) = r   d; (S.1.21)
vw(n; s; l; e) = r; (S.1.22)
vc(n; s; z; e) = u(n)  k; (S.1.23)
vc(n; s; z; e) = q(u(n)  k); (S.1.24)
vw(n; s; z; e) = k   c(n)  d; (S.1.25)
vw(n; s; z; e) = q(k   c(n)) + (1  q)r: (S.1.26)
Here, it is assumed that when a wife does not expend eort and produces no children, she has to leave her husband's
home when he dies. In addition, note that when a wife takes action l, she always prefers not to expend eort. This
is because doing so results in utility r   d, which is lower than utility r achieved with no eort expended.
First, consider a case where widows have limited independent means to support themselves such that r = r0 =
0 and k = k0 c(n). Then, it can be shown that
Proposition S.5 When r = r0 = 0, k = k0  c(n), and (1   q)(u(n)   c(n))  d1 q , the strategy prole
(n; c(n) + d1 q ; a; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n
 and a widow's payo
qd
1 q . When r = r0 = 0, k = k0  c(n), and (1   q)(u(n)   c(n)) < d1 q , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a; e) is
subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n and a widow's payo r0 = 0.
Note that d1 q is an incentive cost needed for a clan to encourage a wife's fertility eort. As this incentive cost
increases, the \no-eort equilibrium" (n; c(n); a; e) tends to arise at equilibrium. The large eort cost d increases
this incentive cost. This incentive cost also becomes larger as a wife's power to control fertility becomes more
limited (i.e., large q), because her limited power enables a clan to achieve its desired fertility without inducing a
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marked fertility eort. Notably, when a clan decides to prompt a wife's fertility eort, she obtains a payo greater
than her reservation utility by an amount of (net) information rent, qd1 q =
d
1 q   d.
Next, consider the case where HIV/AIDS became a serious health problem in a society. Owing to its inuence,
widows' de facto property rights are established as k = k1 > c(n
) and their reservation utility is reduced such that
r = r2 < 0. Now, a clan and a widow obtain the following utility vc(n; s; a; e) = u(n)   s   hc and vw(n; s; a; e)
= s   c(n)   d   hw, along with vc(n; s; a; e) = q(u(n)   s   hc) and vw(n; s; a; e) = q(s   c(n)   hw) + (1   q)r.
Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition S.6 Assume that r = r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough such that    r2
< hc + hw  1. Then,
1. When k1 c(n) < k1 < d1 q +r2 (in this case, n6 < 0 < n < n8), the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame
perfect, along with the equilibrium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q (Case 1).
2. When k1   c(n)  d1 q + r2  k1 (in this case, 0  n6  n < n8)
(a) and u(n8) k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q (Case 2).
(b) and u(n8) k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n6  n and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q = r2 + d1 q   d < qd1 q (Case 3).
3. When d1 q + r2 < k1   c(n) < k1 (in this case, 0 < n < n6 < n8)
(a) and u(n8) k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q (Case 4).
(b) and u(n8) k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equilibrium
number of children n6 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q = r2 +
d
1 q   d < qd1 q (Case 5).
Here, n6 and n8 satisfy k1   c(n6) = d1 q + r2 and k1   c(n8) = r2.
The proposition S.6 suggests that as a result of HIV/AIDS, levirate marriage disappears and a widow makes a
living with her children by inheriting her husband's property. Note that in this example, an incentive cost needed
for a clan to induce a wife's fertility eort is d1 q + r2.
When this incentive cost is very large (i.e., k1 <
d
1 q + r2), a clan does not encourage a wife's fertility eort
and attempts to raise the number of children to the level of n8 > n
 in response to the increasing amount of a
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husband's property bequeathed to her and her children (i.e., Case 1). As this incentive cost decreases (i.e., k1 
d
1 q + r2), a clan has some incentive to elicit a wife's fertility eort. If a clan eventually decides not to induce such
eort, it encourages her to increase fertility to the level of n8 > n
, because a clan believes that she does not incur
the cost of eort and thus, can aord many children by exploiting a husband's bequest (i.e., Case 2 and Case 4). In
all these cases, HIV/AIDS would raise the equilibrium number of children while decreasing widows' welfare. This
prediction follows that implied by the proposition 5.
On the other hand, when a clan decides to encourage a wife to make a fertility eort, whether or not the
equilibrium number of children increases depends upon the amount of her husband's property bequeathed to her
and her children. If the amount is remarkably large (i.e., k1   c(n) > d1 q + r2), a clan encourages fertility to the
level of n6 > n
 (i.e., Case 5). In contrast, if the amount of bequest is small (i.e., k1   c(n)  d1 q + r2), the clan
decides to reduce the number of children to the level of n6  n (i.e., Case 3).
In Case 3 and Case 5, a widow obtains reservation utility plus (net) information rent (i.e., r2 +
qd
1 q ) because
of a clan's compensation for her fertility eort. However, whether her welfare increases or not depends upon her
payo realized in the previous levirate marriage equilibrium. If a woman expended marked fertility eort before,
her utility surely declines from qd1 q to r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, her welfare may increase or decrease from r0 = 0 to
r2+
qd
1 q = r2+
d
1 q d. When r2+ d1 q < d (i.e., very low incentive cost), widows' welfare decreases. When r2+ d1 q
 d, widows' welfare may improve. This welfare improvement is possible despite the induced fertility eort, owing
to the signicant amount of the husband's property inherited by her and her children (i.e., k1  r2 + d1 q ) and
particularly in Case 3, the reduced child-rearing cost.
It is also useful to note that a very low incentive cost borne by a clan (i.e., d1 q + r2 < k1   c(n)) raises the
levels of n6 and n8 (by construction), thereby making u(n8)   u(n6) small owing to concavity of a clan's utility
function. Since this small dierence between u(n8) and u(n6) makes the case of u(n8)   k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q more
likely, it is expected that a clan tends to encourage a wife's fertility eort when the incentive cost is markedly small
(i.e., Case 5).
In sum, when a wife has power over fertility by altering her eort unobserved by a clan, the equilibrium number
of children may decrease in Case 3 and widows' welfare may improve in particular cases of Case 3 and Case 5.
In all the remaining cases, the predictions remained unchanged from those provided by the benchmark analysis.
Importantly, in traditional agrarian societies, women are still expected to have limited power to control fertility
(i.e., large q). In addition, recall from subsection 6.3 that women's access to family planning methods was also
limited during the investigation periods (i.e., large d). Both these factors result in a large incentive cost expended
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by a clan to encourage a wife's fertility eort. In this case, the strategy proles (n; c(n); a; e) and (n8; 0; z; e)
(more precisely, Case 1) tend to arise before and after the deterioration of levirate marriage induced by HIV/AIDS.
Consequently, the equilibrium number of children would increase and widows' welfare would decline.32 Therefore,
the equilibrium prediction in the benchmark model is still robust to consideration of a woman's limited power to
control fertility.
S.2 Threats to identication
In this study, an attempt was made to estimate the correlation between the deterioration of levirate marriage and
welfare outcomes driven by the theoretical mechanisms presented in Section 2. While a triple-dierence approach
was taken to identify such a correlation, several empirical concerns might still have prevented the current study
from achieving the objective. In this section, several identication issues are discussed.
Given the ndings provided in Figure 2 (see Table S.3 for the precise estimates), the analytical results of
consumption reported in this section (i.e., Table S.7 and Table S.8) are based on data pertaining to young female
respondents aged 15 to 28 that enable this study to provide the most distinct empirical ndings in a statistical
sense. However, the relevant estimation results exploiting the full-sample do not alter the implications of the
analyses performed in this section, and are also available upon request.
S.2.1 Migration
Analyses performed in Table 4 and Table 5 used data pertaining to panel respondents who stayed in their original
villages throughout the sample periods (i.e., non-migrants) as well as those who left between wave 1 and wave 5
(i.e., migrants). As described in subsection 3.2.1, exploiting the migrants in the estimations does not necessarily
make the analysis invalid. For example, a woman who became widowed during the sample periods might have left
a KHDS village because she did not have the traditional safety net precisely because of the dissolution of levirate
marriage in that village. In this case, such migrants should be included in the estimated sample.
Nevertheless, Table S.2 reports the reasons for migrations undertaken during the sample periods (in the wave 5
survey) by panel respondents aged 15 to 50. As the results show, almost half of female migration in this group was
driven by marriage. Indeed, owing to traditional rules characterized by clan exogamy and patrilocality, a woman
32More precisely, under the \no-eort equilibrium," the equilibrium number of children that a clan desires may dier from the actual
number of children. However, the expected number of children would still increase from qn to qn8 when the equilibrium shifts from
the prole (n; c(n); a; e) to (n8; 0; z; e). In empirical analyses focusing on \average," changes in the number of children explored in
data would correspond to changes in this expected number.
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in Kagera typically leaves her kin to reside with her husband and thus lives outside her natal village when she
marries (Kudo, 2015). Accordingly, it is possible that the institutional change occurring in the KHDS villages
might have had no relationship with the welfare and decision-making of females who married outside their natal
village between wave 1 and wave 5.
To control for this issue, this study created an indicator for those who left KHDS villages during the sample
periods (notably, this indicator is set to a value of zero for all the observations in wave 1). As seen from the
estimation results in columns (a) and (e) in Table S.7, including this indicator and its interaction with a measure
of levirate marriage in the regressors yielded similar implications to those obtained previously. Furthermore, this
study also modied the indicator so that it would take the value of one even in wave 1 for the observations relevant
to those who migrated out of KHDS villages between wave 1 and wave 5. Controlling for this alternative indicator
and its interaction with Djt leaves the implications almost entirely unaected. The corresponding estimation
results are available from the author upon request.
S.2.2 Attrition
While the rate of sample attrition in the KHDS is not so high, potential \bias" resulting from this possibility
still exists. To mitigate this concern, two exercises were performed. First, this study additionally controlled for
a dummy variable for those who dropped out of the sample between wave 1 and wave 5 (notably, this indicator
takes the value of zero for all the observations in wave 5) and its interaction with Djt, and the relevant estimation
results were reported in columns (b) and (f) in Table S.7. These additional controls did not aect the previously
obtained implications.
Second, this study also exploited the insight obtained from Lee (2009) that under the monotonicity assumption,
trimming the sample observed only under the treated condition helps identify the bounds of the treatment eects
on the sub-population that would always be observed regardless of the treatment assignment.
In wave 5, 36.63% of the female respondents aged 15 to 28 years in wave 1 were not observed in villages that
made levirate marriage less customary during the sample periods (group A), along with the corresponding rate of
30.79% in all the remaining villages (group B). Then, focusing on the same age cohort, this study excluded the
wave 5 respondents belonging to group A as well as to the top or bottom 16 percentiles ( 36.63% 30.79%36.63% ) of the
consumption distribution among the group A respondents in wave 5, and estimated equation (7). Similarly, 31.76%
of the reproductive-age women in wave 1 whose husbands are household heads were missing in group A in wave
5, along with the corresponding rate of 22.26% in group B. This study also removed the wave 5 respondents who
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originated from group A villages and reported the number of children belonging to the top or bottom 30 percentiles
( 31.76% 22.26%31.76% ) of the fertility distribution among group A respondents in wave 5, and estimated equation (8).
Admittedly, these exercises do not necessarily provide the bounds (of the examined correlation) in Lee (2009)'s
original sense, because this study is interested in the correlations between the deterioration of levirate marriage and
consumption of \widows" or fertility of \young" wives, rather than the correlations between institutional change
and consumption or fertility of the total population. Nevertheless, it is still useful to assess the sensitivity of the
estimates based on this approach. The relevant estimation results reported in Table S.8 still provided evidence
indicating a negative correlation between the dissolution of levirate marriage and young widows' consumption as
well as a positive correlation between this institutional change and young wives' fertility.
S.2.3 Selective mortality
Like the attrition issue, selective mortality is another concern. The traditional safety net's disappearance might
have contributed to the deaths of many relatively poor widows in the villages that made levirate marriage less
customary. As a result, in the reform villages in wave 5, the sample used for the estimation of (7) may include a
greater proportion of widows who are wealthy, compared to those living in all the remaining villages. This issue
biases the estimated 2 upward.
The data set contained information on the number of people who died in the past 12 months in each KHDS
village, which enabled this study to calculate a mortality rate (percentage) by dividing this number by the village
population.33 Exploiting such information (interacted with wijt and o
k
ijt) in the estimations in columns (c) and
(g) in Table S.7 yielded similar ndings to those obtained previously. In addition, if such selective mortality does
indeed \bias" the estimates, the supposed correlation between the deterioration of levirate marriage and widows'
welfare would be more negative.
S.2.4 Refugees
In Kagera, the most signicant events that occurred during the sample periods were great inuxes of refugees
from Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) (Alix-Garcia and Saah, 2010; Baez, 2011; Jean-Francois and Verwimp,
2014; Whitaker, 2002). It is possible that the previous analysis was aected by resulting relevant factors such as
massive population displacement, development of aid projects (e.g., establishment of refugee camps, food rationing,
improvement of healthcare facilities), and the associated price changes in both commodity and labor markets
33In wave 1 (5), one village (12 villages) did not report this number. Similarly, information on the total population was absent for
one village (one village) in wave 1 (5). For these villages, it was assumed that the number took the value of the sample average.
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(although the village-specic time-trend may, in part, control for the respective inuences).
The analysis in columns (d) and (h) in Table S.7 control for the number of refugee camps established within
a 25 km radius from each KHDS village during the relevant time frames.34 While this number of camps is time-
invariant, it is still possible to include the number interacted with wijt and o
k
ijt. Inclusion of these additional
controls did not change the implications derived from the previous analysis.
S.2.5 Potential noise of the measured marital status
Another important concern is the possibility that female marital status may be subject to noise. Specically, it
is not clearly discerned from the dataset based on the standard survey module whether the survey enumerators
identied the status of females who lost their husband and entered into a levirate marriage as \widowed" or
\married" (Luke, 2006).35 If the enumerators tend to view females engaging in levirate marriage as \married,"
the current concern could possibly \bias" the estimated 2 downward because the enumerators are more likely to
identify as \widowed" those who are wealthy and therefore avoid levirate marriage as well as stay independent.
In other words, poor widows who engaged in this traditional marriage might have been included in the \married"
group in wave 1. However, in villages where the practice of levirate marriage became less customary, similarly poor
widows might have belonged to the \widowed" group in wave 5.
However, note that if this concern is true (i.e., while the enumerators called marital status of poor widows
engaging in levirate marriage \married" before, similarly poor widows come to be included in a group of \widowed"
because of the disappearance of the practice), the proportion of females whom the enumerators regard as \widowed"
is likely to increase in villages where the customary practices became less common. However, as described in Section
4 (see also Table S.1), the simple DID estimate did not reject the null hypothesis that the likelihood of widowhood
was not aected by the institutional change.
Moreover, if the enumerators indeed regard an inherited widow as \married," they are less likely to identify
her as \a household head" compared to a widow who refused levirate marriage. Then, the correlation between
being a household head and being widowed is likely to increase in villages where the customary practice became
less conventional compared to that found in all the remaining villages. The exercises performed to check this
correlation in Table S.9 provided no evidence supporting this possibility.
34In that time frame, 13 refugee camps were established: Benaco, Burigi, Chabalisa, Kagenyi, Keza, Kitalli, Lukole A, Lukole B,
Mbuba, Musuhura, Mwisa, Omukariro, and Rubwera. Information on a village's distance to these camps is available from http:
//www.edi-africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm owing to a contribution made by Jean-Francois Maystadt.
35Note that this question is dierent from \whether inherited widows or community members identify the widows' marital status
as `widowed' or `married.'" Based on the author's eld interviews with the Luo in rural Tanzania, an inherited widow is still socially
recognized as being in a marital relationship with the deceased husband. In addition, even children to a widow and her inheritor are
viewed as those of the deceased (and the widow).
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Overall, the author's view on this measurement issue is that the enumerators still identied widows inherited
by other male relatives as \widowed" in the survey because levirate marriage (also called widow inheritance) is
seen as being dierent from standard marriage. It should also be noted that an inherited widow does not typically
live together with her inheritor, who resides with his wife and children at his homestead. In addition, an inherited
widow does not share a household budget with her inheritor's family when purchasing food and other items. In the
KHDS, household members are dened as including \all people who normally sleep and eat their meals together
in the household during at least three of the twelve months preceding the interview."
S.2.6 Within-village trend between widows' and other women's consumption
Consumption enjoyed by \Other" females shown in Figure S.3 might have declined in villages where the practice
of levirate marriage became less common, provided that the disappearance of this practice coincided with an
increase in the investment (e.g., fertility) made by currently married females (who are, thus, included in the
\Other" group). In turn, this means that the current empirical approach comparing widows' consumption with
that of \Other" females within the same village might have underestimated the negative correlation between the
institutional change and widows' consumption.
S.2.7 Selected sample of a head's wife
In the analysis of fertility, limiting attention to data on females whose husbands are household heads potentially
generates \bias," if they have particular preferences for fertility that are correlated with the village-level prevalence
of levirate marriage. To alleviate this concern, this study replaced fijt in equation (8) with an indicator for a
head's wife, and estimated the equation for all females aged 15 to 50. The results reported in Table S.10, where
the exploited controls in columns (a) to (e) correspond to those used in columns (a) to (e) in Table 5, provided no
evidence indicating signicant eects of the institutional change on the probability of being a head's wife.
S.3 Assessing the subjective measure of HIV prevalence in the KHDS
In each wave of the KHDS, the survey team asked a group of village leaders about the health-relevant situation
in a community. The number of villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health
problem in a community increased from 18 in wave 1 to 32 in wave 5, with the corresponding in-between gures
summarized as 25, 24, and 35 in wave 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
63
An attempt was made to assess the extent to which this information is useful for an empirical analysis. First, the
wave 5 (i.e., 2004) information was rst evaluated based on data sourced from the 2003?04 Tanzania HIV/AIDS
Indicator Survey (2003?04 THIS), which is the rst population-based comprehensive survey carried out on this
infectious disease in Tanzania. With the technical assistance provided by the MEASURE DHS program, this
survey was conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in cooperation with the Tanzania Commission
for AIDS (TACAIDS) and the National AIDS Control Program (NACP) from December 2003 to March 2004.36
In this survey, the respondents' blood was collected for HIV testing if they volunteered for the test.
By taking the following three steps, the quality of the wave 5 information was checked. First, a proportion of
HIV-positive respondents among those that went for the testing was calculated for each THIS community. Second,
two proxies for HIV prevalence in a KHDS community at the time of the wave 5 survey (i.e., 2004) were constructed
based on the calculated proportion, namely (1) the proportion in a THIS community in closest proximity to a KHDS
community and (2) an average of the corresponding proportion among the THIS communities situated within a
40-km radius from a KHDS community (see Figure S.9 for the position of the KHDS and THIS communities).37
Third, an indicator for the KHDS villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health
problem in wave 5 was regressed on these biomarker-based measures of HIV/AIDS prevalence.
Approximately 50% (80%) of the 51 KHDS communities corresponded with the nearest THIS community
situated less than 10 (18) km away, with the KHDS community having a maximum distance of approximately
34 km to the nearest THIS community. Among the 51 communities, the mean infection rate based on the HIV-
positive population in the nearest THIS communities is 0.049, with the minimum rate of zero that is recorded
in 14 communities as well as the maximum gure of 0.138. The mean of the average infected proportion in the
THIS communities surrounding a KHDS community is 0.041, with the minimum (maximum) gure of zero (0.081).
Based on this measure, no HIV-positive case was identied in nine communities.
The estimated infection rate of the KHDS communities seems plausible, compared with that provided by several
studies that date back to the late 1980s. As seen from Figure 5-3 (p. 147) in Ainsworth et al. (1998), for example,
the estimated HIV prevalence among sexually active adults in 1989 is the greatest in Kagera among all the regions
of Tanzania, with the infected population estimated at more than 10% in the urban and more than 3% in the rural
areas.
Regressing the KHDS-based indicator pertaining to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in wave 5 on these objective
36See Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS), National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and ORC Macro (2005) for the details. The
data and relevant documents are available from https://dhsprogram.com/what-we-do/survey/survey-display-234.cfm.
37The positional information of the KHDS communities was obtained from the survey team under the author's agreement relevant
to the condentiality of the surveyed communities.
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measures yielded the results reported in Table S.11. In columns (a) and (b), the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the
nearest THIS community was used as an explanatory variable, with or without the control of a KHDS community's
distance (km) to the nearest THIS community. In analyses in columns (c) and (d), a continuous measure of the
prevalence exploited in columns (a) and (b) was replaced by an indicator, equal to one if the prevalence was positive
and zero otherwise. The mean of the average HIV-positive proportion in the THIS communities in the vicinity of a
KHDS community was utilized in the estimations reported in columns (e) and (f), whereby a continuous measure
of the prevalence was used in the former, with the latter exploiting an indicator that takes one if the prevalence
was positive and zero otherwise.
As the results show, all the estimated coecients of interest are positive and particularly in the estimations
exploiting the indicators, the statistical signicance is more evident. These ndings suggest that the HIV/AIDS-
relevant information collected in wave 5 of the KHDS is consistent with the biomarker-based prevalence of HIV/AIDS
and thus is still helpful in measuring the signicance that this communicable disease had on the surveyed commu-
nities.
For the quality assessment of the information in waves 1?4 (i.e., 1991?1994), the district-level values of
the infection rate reported in Killewo et al. (1990) were assigned to each KHDS community. Killewo et al. (1990)
conducted a population-based survey in Kagera in 1987 and estimated that the overall prevalence of HIV-1 infection
among adults aged 15?54 was 9.6%, with a higher prevalence in the Bukoba Urban district (24.2%) compared
with rural areas of the region (10.0% for the Bukoba Rural and Muleba districts, 4.5% for the Karagwe district,
and 0.4% for the Ngara and Biharamulo districts).
As shown in columns (g) (for wave 1) and (h) (for all the earlier four waves) in Table S.11, regressing an indicator
for the KHDS villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second-most important health problem with respect
to this district-level prevalence also yielded statistically signicant positive coecients. This statistical signicance
is obtained at the conventional levels even if the standard errors are adjusted for clustering on a district. The
information pertaining to HIV-prevalence collected in the earlier four waves in the KHDS also appears consistent
with the actual prevalence.
S.4 Proof
In this section, all the propositions claimed in this paper are proved. The basic strategy for the proof is as follows.
First, for a certain range of n, a strategy prole that enables a clan to obtain maximum utility when a widows
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rejects levirate marriage is explored. Second, for the same range of n, a strategy prole that enables a clan to
encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage and to obtain maximum utility is explored. Third, of all these
strategy proles, the strategy prole that enables a clan to receive the greatest utility is selected as a pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 1:
Find n0 satisfying k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Since k0  c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n0)  c(n), i.e.,
n0  n (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n0).
First, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, k0   c(n)  k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. So, a widow chooses action z
when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k0. A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), yielding vc = u(n0)   k0
= u(n0)   c(n0) as well as vw = k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n 
n0, it must be the case that s   c(n)  k0   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)   k0. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in vc =
u(n0)  s = u(n0)  k0 = u(n0)  c(n0) and vw = s  c(n0) = k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the
strategy proles (n0; 0; z) and (n0; c(n0); a) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n0)  c(n0).
In case of n  n0 (i.e., k0   c(n)  r0 = 0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage.
Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility by
selecting n = n, yielding vc = u(n)   c(n)    and vw = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage for n  n0, it must be the case that s  c(n)  r0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) and obtains utility
u(n)   c(n). A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n)   c(n) and vw =
r0 = 0. Since u(n
)  c(n) > u(n)  c(n)   , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) provides a clan with maximum
utility u(n)  c(n).
Since u(n)  c(n) > u(n0)  c(n0), the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect. In this case, a widow
obtains utility r0 = 0.
Proof of proposition 2:
Find n1 satisfying k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. Since k1 > c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n1) > c(n), i.e., n1
> n (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n1).
First, consider the case of n  n1. In this case, k1   c(n)  k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. So, a widow chooses action z
when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k1. A clan
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can maximize this utility by selecting n = n1 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n1), yielding vc = u(n1)   k1
= u(n1)   c(n1) as well as vw = k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n 
n1, it must be the case that s   c(n)  k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k1 and obtains utility u(n)   k1. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n1 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n1), which results in vc =
u(n1)  s = u(n1)  k1 = u(n1)  c(n1) and vw = s  c(n1) = k1   c(n1) = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n1, the
strategy proles (n1; 0; z) and (n1; c(n1); a) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n1)  c(n1).
In case of n  n1 (i.e., k1  c(n)  r0 = 0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given
the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility subject
to n  n1 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n1 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n1)   c(n1)    as well as vw =
r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to choose levirate marriage for n  n1, it must be the case that s   c(n)  r0 =
0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) and obtains utility u(n)   c(n). A clan can maximize this utility subject to n
 n1 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n1 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n1)   c(n1) and vw = r0 = 0.
Since u(n1)   c(n1) > u(n1)   c(n1)    , the strategy prole (n1; c(n1); a) provides a clan with maximum utility
u(n1)  c(n1) when n  n1.
Consequently, both the strategy proles (n1; 0; z) and (n1; c(n1); a) are subgame perfect. In this case, a widow
obtains utility r0 = 0.
Proof of proposition 3:
Find n2 satisfying k0   c(n2) = r1. Since k0  c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n2) < c(n) (i.e., c(n2) =
k0   r1 < k0  c(n)), therefore n2 < n (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n2). Now,
two cases are considered, either r1  k0 or r1 < k0.
Case 1: r1  k0.
Note that for any value of n, a widow never chooses action z when she rejects levirate marriage, because k0   c(n)
 r1   c(n)  r1. Then, given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n, yielding vc = u(n)  c(n)  as well as vw = r1. To encourage a widow
to accept levirate marriage for any value of n, it must be the case that s   c(n)  r1. Then, a clan chooses s =
c(n) + r1 and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  r1. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results
in vc = u(n
)   c(n)   r1 and vw = s   c(n) = r1. Thus, when r1 >  , the strategy prole (n; 0; l) provides
a clan with maximum utility u(n)  c(n)   . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n; c(n) + r1; a) provides a clan
with maximum utility u(n)  c(n)  r1.
Case 2: r1 < k0
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First, consider the case of n  n2. In this case, k0   c(n)  k0   c(n2) = r1. So, a widows chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   k0. A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n2 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n2), yielding vc = u(n2)   k0 =
u(n2)  c(n2)  r1 as well as vw = k0  c(n2) = r1. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n2, it
must be the case that s  c(n)  k0   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)  k0. A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n2 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n2), which results in vc = u(n2)  s
= u(n2)  k0 = u(n2)  c(n2)  r1 and vw = s  c(n2) = k0   c(n2) = r1. Consequently, for n  n2, the strategy
proles (n2; 0; z) and (n2; c(n2) + r1; a) provide a clan with maximum utility u(n2)  c(n2)  r1.
In case of n  n2 (i.e., k0   c(n)  r1), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the
action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n =
n, yielding vc = u(n)  c(n)   as well as vw = r1. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n 
n2, it must be the case that s c(n)  r1. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n)+r1 and obtains utility u(n) c(n) r1. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n) c(n) r1 and vw = s c(n) = r1.
Consequently, for n  n2, the strategy prole (n; 0; l) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n) c(n)  when
r1 >  . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n
; c(n)+ r1; a) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n)  c(n)  r1.
Here, note that when r1 >  , it is the case that u(n
)  c(n)   > u(n)  c(n)  r1 > u(n2)  c(n2)  r1. In
addition, it is always the case that u(n)  c(n)  r1 > u(n2)  c(n2)  r1.
Considering both the cases of r1  k0 and r1 < k0, when r1 >  , the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect.
Otherwise, the strategy prole (n; c(n) + r1; a) is subgame perfect. In both cases, a widow obtains utility r1.
Proof of proposition 4:
First, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, k0   c(n)  k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. So, a widow chooses action z
when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k0. A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), yielding vc = u(n0)   k0
= u(n0)   c(n0) as well as vw = k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n
 n0, it must be the case that s   c(n)   hw  k0   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k0 + hw and obtains utility
u(n)   k0   hw   hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n 
n0), which results in vc = u(n0)  s hc = u(n0) k0 hw hc = u(n0)  c(n0) hw hc and vw = s  c(n0) hw
= k0 + hw   c(n0)  hw = k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy prole (n0; 0; z) provides a
clan with maximum utility u(n0)  c(n0).
In case of n  n0 (i.e., k0   c(n)  r0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the
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action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting
n = n, yielding vc = u(n)   c(n)    as well as vw = r0 = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage for n  n0, it must be the case that s   c(n)   hw  r0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + hw and
obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  hw   hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc =
u(n)  c(n)  hw   hc and vw = s  c(n)  hw = r0 = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy prole (n; 0; l)
provides a clan with maximum utility u(n)  c(n)   .
Now, compare u(n0) c(n0) with u(n) c(n)  . When     u(n) c(n) u(n0)+c(n0), it becomes that
u(n0) c(n0)  u(n) c(n)  . Then, the strategy prole (n0; 0; z) is subgame perfect. Otherwise, u(n0) c(n0)
< u(n)   c(n)    and thus, the strategy prole (n; 0; l) is subgame perfect. In both cases, a widow obtains
utility r0 = 0.
Proof of proposition 5:
Find n3 satisfying k1  c(n3) = r2. Since k1 > c(n) > c(n) + r2 by assumption, it is the case that c(n3) > c(n),
i.e., n3 > n
 (see also Figure S.2 for the graphical interpretation of n and n3).
First, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, k1   c(n)  k1   c(n3) = r2. So, a widow chooses action z
when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k1. A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n3 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n3), yielding vc = u(n3)   k1
= u(n3)   c(n3)   r2 as well as vw = k1   c(n3) = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage n 
n3, it must be the case that s   c(n)   hw  k1   c(n). Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility
u(n)   k1   hw   hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n3 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n
 n3), which results in vc = u(n3)   s   hc = u(n3)   k1   hw   hc = u(n3)   c(n3)   r2   hw   hc and vw =
s   c(n3)   hw = k1 + hw   c(n3)   hw = r2. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) provides a
clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)  r2.
In case of n  n3 (i.e., k1   c(n)  r2), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the
action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility subject to n 
n3 > n
. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n3)   c(n3)    as well as vw = r2. To
encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that s   c(n)   hw  r2. Then, a
clan chooses s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility u(n)   c(n)   r2   hw   hc. A clan can maximize this utility
subject to n  n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n3)   s   hc =
u(n3)  c(n3)  r2 hw  hc and vw = s  c(n3) hw = r2. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; l)
provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)   .
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Since u(n3)  c(n3)  r2 > u(n3)  c(n3)   , the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) is subgame perfect. In this case, a
widow obtains utility r2.
Proof of proposition S.1:
Find n^0 satisfying k^0   c(n^0) =  g. Since k^0  c(n)   g by assumption, it is the case that c(n^0)  c(n), i.e.,
n^0  n. Also, note that a widow never chooses the action l2 because  c(n)  b < k^0   c(n). Then, consider two
cases of n  n^0 and n  n^0. Following similar steps taken when proving the proposition 1 yields proposition S.1.
Proof of proposition S.2:
Find n^1 satisfying k^1   c(n^1) = r2   g. Since k^1 > c(n)   g > c(n) + r2   g by assumption, it is the case that
c(n^1) > c(n
), i.e., n^1 > n. Also, note that a widow never chooses the action l2 because r2  c(n)  b < k^1  c(n).
Then, consider two cases of n  n^1 and n  n^1. Following similar steps taken when proving the proposition 5
yields proposition S.2.
Proof of proposition S.3:
Recall n0 satisfying k0  c(n0) = r0 = 0. Since k0  c(n) by assumption, it is the case that c(n0)  c(n), i.e., n0
 n. Also, nd np satisfying u0(np) = (1  p)c0(np). Note that n  np, which can be proved as follows; suppose
n > np, u0(np) > u0(n) = c0(n) > c0(np), which is a contradiction to u0(np) = (1 p)c0(np). Therefor, it becomes
n0  n  np.
First, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, p(k0   c(n))  p(k0   c(n0)) = pr0 = 0. So, a widow
chooses action z when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility
u(n)   pk0   (1   p)c(n)   (1   p) . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the
domain of n  n0), yielding vc = u(n0)   pk0   (1   p)c(n0)   (1   p) = u(n0)   c(n0)   (1   p) as well as
vw = p(k0   c(n0)) = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n0, it must be the case that
p(s   c(n))  p(k0   c(n)). Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)   pk0   (1   p)c(n)   (1   p) .
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in
vc = u(n0)   pk0   (1   p)c(n0)   (1   p) = u(n0)   c(n0)   (1   p) and vw = p(s   c(n0)) = p(k0   c(n0)) =
0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy proles (n0; 0; z) and (n0; c(n0); a) provide a clan with maximum utility
u(n0)  c(n0)  (1  p) .
In case of n  n0 (i.e., p(k0   c(n))  pr0 = 0), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage.
Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility by
selecting n = n, yielding vc = u(n)   c(n)    as well as vw = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate
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marriage for n  n0, it must be the case that p(s   c(n))  pr0 = 0. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) and obtains
utility u(n)   c(n)   (1   p) . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc =
u(n)   c(n)   (1   p) and vw = p(s   c(n)) = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, the strategy prole (n; c(n); a)
provides a clan with maximum utility u(n)  c(n)  (1  p) .
Since u(n)  c(n)  (1  p) > u(n0)  c(n0)  (1  p) , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a) is subgame perfect.
In this case, a widows obtains utility pr0 = 0.
Proof of proposition S.4:
Recall n3 satisfying k1  c(n3) = r2. Since k1 > c(n) > c(n)+r2 by assumption, it is the case that c(n3) > c(n),
i.e., n3 > n
. Also, recall np satisfying u0(np) = (1   p)c0(np), whereby n  np Now, two cases are considered,
either k1  c(np) + r2 (i.e., c(n) < k1  c(np) + r2) or k1 > c(np) + r2 (including both the cases of k1 > c(n) >
c(np) + r2 and k1 > c(np) + r2 > c(n
)).
Case 1: k1  c(np) + r2.
Since c(n3) = k1   r2  c(np), it is the case that n3  np. Consequently, n < n3  np.
First, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, p(k1   c(n))  p(k1   c(n3)) = pr2. So, a widow chooses
action z when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  
pk1   (1  p)c(n)  (1  p) . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc =
u(n3) pk1 (1 p)c(n3) (1 p) = u(n3) c(n3) pr2 (1 p) as well as vw = p(k1 c(n3)) = pr2. To encourage
a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that p(s  c(n)  hw)  p(k1   c(n)). Then, a
clan chooses s = k1+hw and obtains utility u(n) pk1 phw phc (1 p)c(n) (1 p) . A clan can maximize this
utility by selecting n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n3) pk1 phw phc (1 p)c(n3) (1 p) =
u(n3) c(n3) pr2 (1 p) phw phc and vw = p(s c(n3) hw) = p(k1+hw c(n3) hw) = pr2. Consequently,
for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; z) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)  pr2   (1  p) .
In case of n  n3 (i.e., p(k1   c(n))  pr2), a widow chooses action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given
the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  c(n)   . A clan can maximize this utility subject to
n  n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n3)  c(n3)   as well as vw = pr2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that p(s   c(n)   hw)  pr2.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  pr2   phw   phc   (1  p) . A clan can
maximize this utility subject to n  n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc
= u(n3)   c(n3)   pr2   phw   phc   (1   p) and vw = p(s   c(n3)   hw) = pr2. Consequently, for n  n3, the
strategy prole (n3; 0; l) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)   .
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Since u(n3)  c(n3) pr2  (1 p) > u(n3)  c(n3)  (1 p) > u(n3)  c(n3)   , the strategy prole (n3; 0; z)
is subgame perfect. In this case, a widow obtains utility pr2.
Case 2: k1 > c(np) + r2.
Since k1 > c(np) + r2, c(n3) = k1   r2 > c(np), so n3 > np. Consequently, n  np < n3.
First, consider the case of n  n3. In this case, p(k1  c(n))  p(k1  c(n3)) = pr2. So, a widow chooses action
z when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  pk1  (1 
p)c(n) (1 p) . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n= np, yielding vc = u(np) pk1 (1 p)c(np) (1 p)
= u(np) pc(n3)  (1 p)c(np) pr2  (1 p) as well as vw = p(k1  c(np)) = pr2+pc(n3) pc(np). To encourage
a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that p(s   c(n)   hw)  p(k1   c(n)). Then,
a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility u(n)   pk1   phw   phc   (1   p)c(n)   (1   p) . A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = np, which results in vc = u(np)  pk1   phw   phc   (1  p)c(np)  (1  p)
= u(np)  pc(n3)  (1  p)c(np)  pr2   phw   phc   (1  p) and vw = p(s  c(np)  hw) = pr2 + pc(n3)  pc(np).
Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (np; 0; z) provides a clan with maximum utility u(np) pc(n3)  (1 
p)c(np)  pr2   (1  p) .
In case of n  n3 (i.e., p(k1   c(n))  pr2), a widow choose action l when she rejects levirate marriage. Given
the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)   c(n)    . A clan can maximize this utility subject
to n  n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), yielding vc = u(n3)   c(n3)    as well as vw =
pr2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage for n  n3, it must be the case that s   c(n)   hw  r2.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  pr2   phw   phc   (1  p) . A clan can
maximize this utility subject to n  n3 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n3 (corner solution), which results in vc =
u(n3) c(n3) pr2 phw phc (1 p) and vw = p(s c(n3) hw) = pr2. Note that  < (1 p)+pr2+phw+phc
because    r2 < hw + hc by assumption. Consequently, for n  n3, the strategy prole (n3; 0; l) provides a clan
with maximum utility u(n3)  c(n3)   .
Now, compare utility u(np)  pc(n3)  (1  p)c(np)  pr2   (1  p) with u(n3)  c(n3)   . Since u(np)  (1 
p)c(np)  pr2 > u(np)  (1  p)c(np) > u(n3)  (1  p)c(n3), it becomes that u(np)  pc(n3)  (1  p)c(np)  pr2
> u(n3)   c(n3), which indicates u(np)   pc(n3)   (1   p)c(np)   pr2   (1   p) > u(n3)   c(n3)    . Thus, the
strategy prole (np; 0; z) is subgame perfect. In this case, a widows obtains utility pr2 + pc(n3)  pc(np).
Note that pr2+ pc(n3)  pc(np) = pr2+ p(k1  r2  c(np)) = p(k1  c(np)). Thus, when k1  c(np), it becomes
that p(k1   c(np))  0. Otherwise, p(k1   c(np)) < 0.
Proof of proposition S.5:
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Recall n0 satisfying k0   c(n0) = r0 = 0. Find n4 and n5 satisfying k0   c(n4) = d1 q and k0   c(n5) = d. Since
d
1 q > d > 0, it is the case that n4 < n5 < n0. In addition, since c(n4) = k0   d1 q < k0 = c(n0)  c(n), it is the
case that c(n4) < c(n0)  c(n), i.e., n4 < n0  n. Since c(n5) = k0  d < k0 = c(n0)  c(n), it is the case that
c(n5) < c(n0)  c(n), i.e., n5 < n0  n. Consequently, it becomes that n4 < n5 < n0  n.
Also, note that, to prompt a wife's fertility eort when she chooses action z, it must be the case that k0 c(n) d
 q(k0   c(n)) + (1   q)r0, i.e., k0   c(n)  d1 q . Similarly, to prompt a wife's fertility eort when she chooses
action a, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  q(s  c(n)) + (1  q)r0, i.e., s  c(n) + d1 q . Now, two cases are
considered, either k0  d1 q or k0 < d1 q .
Case 1: k0  d1 q .
First, consider the case of n  n4. In this case, a widow has an incentive to make fertility eort when she
chooses action z. Since k0   c(n)  d  k0   c(n4)  d > k0   c(n5)  d = 0, a widow chooses action z and makes
fertility eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility
u(n)  k0. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n4 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n4), yielding
vc = u(n4)  k0 = u(n4)  c(n4)  d1 q as well as vw = k0   c(n4)  d = d1 q   d = qd1 q . To encourage a widow to
accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n  n4, it must be the case that s c(n) d  k0 c(n) d
(i.e., s  k0) and s  c(n) + d1 q . Since k0   c(n)   d1 q = c(n4)   c(n)  0, the above conditions result in s 
k0  c(n) + d1 q . Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility u(n)   k0. A clan can maximize this utility
by selecting n = n4 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n4), which results in vc = u(n4)   s = u(n4)   k0 =
u(n4)   c(n4)   d1 q and vw = s   c(n4)   d = k0   c(n4)   d = qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage without making fertility eort for n  n4, it must be the case that q(s   c(n))  k0   c(n)   d (i.e., s
 k0q   dq   1 qq c(n)) and s  c(n) + d1 q . Since

k0
q   dq   1 qq c(n)

 

c(n) + d1 q

= 1q

k0   c(n)  d1 q

=
1
q (c(n4)  c(n))  0, it is not possible to encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility
eort. Consequently, for n  n4, the strategy proles (n4; 0; z; e) and (n4; c(n4) + d1 q ; a; e) provide a clan with
maximum utility u(n4)  c(n4)  d1 q .
Second, consider the case of n4  n  n0. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when
she chooses action z. Since q(k0   c(n))  q(k0   c(n0)) = 0, a widow chooses action z and makes no fertility
eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  k0).
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), yielding vc =
q(u(n0)   k0) = q (u(n0)  c(n0)) as well as vw = q(k0   c(n0)) = 0. To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage while making fertility eort for n4  n  n0, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  q(k0   c(n)) (i.e., s
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 q(k0  c(n))+ c(n)+ d) and s  c(n)+ d1 q . Since q(k0  c(n))+ c(n)+ d 

c(n) + d1 q

= q

k0   c(n)  d1 q

= q(c(n4)  c(n))  0, the above conditions result in s  c(n)+ d1 q  q(k0  c(n)) + c(n) + d for all n4  n  n0.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n)+ d1 q and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  d1 q . In this case, a clan can maximize utility
by selecting n = n0 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n0)  c(n0)  d1 q and vw = s  c(n0)  d = qd1 q . To
encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n4  n  n0, it must be the case
that q(s   c(n))  q(k0   c(n)) (i.e., s  k0) and s  c(n) + d1 q . Since k0  

c(n) + d1 q

= c(n4)   c(n)  0,
the above conditions result in k0  s  c(n) + d1 q . Then, a clan chooses s = k0 and obtains utility q(u(n)  k0).
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n0 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n0), which results in vc
= q(u(n0)  s) = q(u(n0)  k0) = q (u(n0)  c(n0)) and vw = q(s  c(n0)) = q(k0   c(n0)) = 0. Consequently, for
n4  n  n0, either of q(u(n0)  c(n0)) or u(n0)  c(n0)  d1 q provides a clan with maximum utility, depending
upon the relevant functional forms and parameter values.
Third, consider the case of n  n0. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since q(k0   c(n))  q(k0   c(n0)) = 0, a widow chooses action l and makes no fertility eort when she
rejects levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   c(n)   ). A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, yielding vc = q(u(n)  c(n)  ) as well as vw = 0. To encourage a
widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n  n0, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d 
0 and s  c(n) + d1 q , namely s  c(n) + d1 q > c(n) + d. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q and obtains utility
u(n)  c(n)  d1 q . A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n)  c(n)  d1 q
and vw = s  c(n) d = qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for
n  n0, it must be the case that q(s  c(n))  0 and s  c(n) + d1 q , namely c(n)  s  c(n) + d1 q . Then, a clan
chooses s = c(n) and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)). A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which
results in vc = q (u(n
)  c(n)) and vw = q(s  c(n)) = 0. Consequently, for n  n0, when (1  q)(u(n)  c(n))
 d1 q , it becomes that u(n)  c(n)  d1 q  q(u(n)  c(n)) > q(u(n)  c(n)  ). In this case, the strategy
prole (n; c(n)+ d1 q ; a; e) provides a clan with maximum utility u(n
) c(n)  d1 q . When (1 q)(u(n) c(n))
< d1 q , it becomes q(u(n
)   c(n)) > u(n)   c(n)   d1 q and q(u(n)   c(n)) > q(u(n)   c(n)   ). In this
case, the strategy prole (n; c(n); a; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n)  c(n)).
Now, compare maximum utility achieved in the respective case. Note that u(n4)   c(n4)   d1 q < u(n)  
c(n)   d1 q ; q(u(n0)   c(n0)) < q(u(n)   c(n)); and u(n0)   c(n0)   d1 q < u(n)   c(n)   d1 q . Thus, when
(1  q)(u(n)  c(n))  d1 q , the strategy prole (n; c(n) + d1 q ; a; e) is subagme perfect. In this case, a widow
obtains utility qd1 q . When (1  q)(u(n)  c(n)) < d1 q , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a; e) is subagme perfect. In
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this case, a widow obtains utility r0 = 0.
Case 2: k0 <
d
1 q .
In this case, a wife never makes fertility eort when she rejects levirate marriage. In this case, it is ne to consider
two cases of n  n0 and n  n0. Applying similar proof exploited in the Case 1 to these cases, it becomes that the
strategy prole (n; c(n) + d1 q ; a; e) is subagme perfect when (1  q)(u(n)  c(n))  d1 q . In this case, a widow
obtains utility qd1 q . When (1  q)(u(n)  c(n)) < d1 q , the strategy prole (n; c(n); a; e) is subagme perfect. In
this case, a widow obtains utility r0 =0.
Proof of proposition S.6:
Find n6, n7, and n8 satisfying k1   c(n6) = d1 q + r2, k1   c(n7) = r2 + d, and k1   c(n8) = r2. Since d1 q + r2 >
d+ r2 > r2, it is the case that n6 < n7 < n8. In addition, since c(n8) = k1   r2 > k1 > c(n), it is the case that
c(n8) > c(n
), i.e., n8 > n.
Also, note that to prompt a wife's fertility eort when she chooses action z, it must be the case that k1 c(n) d
 q(k1  c(n)) + (1  q)r2, i.e., k1  c(n)  d1 q + r2. Similarly, to prompt a wife's fertility eort when she chooses
action a, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d  hw  q(s  c(n)  hw) + (1  q)r2, i.e., s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Now, two cases are considered, either d1 q + r2 > 0 or
d
1 q + r2  0.
Case 1: d1 q + r2 > 0.
Now, consider three subcases of either k1 <
d
1 q + r2,
d
1 q + r2  k1  c(n)+ d1 q + r2, and k1 > c(n)+ d1 q + r2.
Subcase 1: k1 <
d
1 q + r2.
Since k1 <
d
1 q +r2 < c(n
)+ d1 q +r2, it is the case that c(n6) = k1  d1 q  r2 < c(n), so n6 < n. Consequently,
n6 < 0 < n
 < n8. Also, note that in this case, a wife never makes fertility eort when she rejects leviraet marriage.
First, consider the case of 0  n  n8. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when she
choose action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  k1). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), yielding vc = q(u(n8)  k1) =
q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) as well as vw = q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for 0  n  n8, it must be the case
that s c(n) d hw  q(k1 c(n))+(1 q)r2 (i.e., s qk1+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw) and s c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2.
Since (qk1 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw) 

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= q

k1   d1 q   r2   c(n)

< 0, the above
conditions result in s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 > qk1 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw. Then, a clan chooses s =
c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2 and obtains utility u(n) c(n)  d1 q r2 hw hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting
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n = n, which results in vc = u(n)  c(n)  d1 q   r2  hw   hc and vw = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2  c(n)  d  hw
= r2 +
qd
1 q .
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for 0  n  n8, it must be
case that q(s  c(n)  hw) + (1  q)r2  q(k1   c(n)) + (1  q)r2 (i.e., s  k1 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   d1 q   r2   c(n) < 0, the above conditions result in k1 + hw  s
 c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility q(u(n)   k1   hw   hc). A clan
can maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), which results in vc =
q(u(n8)  k1   hw   hc) = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
Since q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) < q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2), the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+ r2+hw; a; e) is
not selected. Given an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) > u(n)  c(n) 
d
1 q   r2   hw   hc. Consequently, for 0  n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum
utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2).
Second, consider the case of n  n8. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when she
choose action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action l when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   c(n)   ). A
clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), yielding vc =
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) as well as vw = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility
eort for n  n8, it must be the case that s   c(n)   d   hw  r2 and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2, yielding s 
c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2  c(n) + d + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility
u(n)  c(n)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects
n = n8 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n8)  c(n8)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw = s  c(n8)  d  hw
= r2 +
qd
1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n  n8, it must
be the case that q(s   c(n)   hw) + (1   q)r2  r2 (i.e., s  c(n) + r2 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2,
yielding c(n) + r2 + hw  s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + r2 + hw and obtains utility
q (u(n)  c(n)  r2   hw   hc). A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n =
n8 (corner solution), which results in vc = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s c(n8) hw)+(1 q)r2 =
r2. Since q(u(n8) c(n8) ) > q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) due to  r2 < hw+hc and q(u(n8) c(n8) ) >
u(n8) c(n8)  d1 q r2 hw hc due to an innitely large disease cost, the strategy proles (n8; c(n8)+r2+hw; a; e)
and (n8; c(n8) +
d
1 q + r2 + hw; a; e) are not selected. Consequently, for n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e)
provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ).
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Now, compare utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) and q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ). Since q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) > q(u(n8) 
c(n8)   ), the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) is not selected. As a result, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a
clan with maximum utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2). In this case, a widow obtains utility r2.
Subcase 2: d1 q + r2  k1  c(n) + d1 q + r2.
Since k1  c(n) + d1 q + r2, it is the case that c(n6) = k1   d1 q   r2  c(n), so n6  n. Consequently, 0  n6
 n < n8.
First, consider the case of n  n6. In this case, a wife has an incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since k1 c(n) d  k1 c(n6) d > k1 c(n7) d = r2. So, a widow chooses action z and makes fertility
eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k1. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n6), yielding vc = u(n6) k1
= u(n6)   c(n6)   d1 q   r2 as well as vw = k1   c(n6)   d = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage while making fertility eort, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d hw  k1  c(n)  d (i.e., s  k1+hw)
and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw + r2. Since k1+hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1  c(n)  d1 q   r2 = c(n6)  c(n)  0,
the above conditions result in s  k1 + hw  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains
utility u(n) k1 hw hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n
 n6), which results in vc = u(n6) k1 hw hc = u(n6) c(n6)  d1 q  r2 hw hc and vw = s c(n6) d hw =
k1+hw c(n6) d hw = r2+ qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort,
it must be the case that q(s c(n) hw)+(1 q)r2  k1 c(n) d (i.e., s  k1q   dq   1 qq c(n)  1 qq r2+hw) and s 
c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2. Since

k1
q   dq   1 qq c(n)  1 qq r2 + hw

 

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= 1q

k1   c(n)  d1 q   r2

= 1q (c(n6)   c(n))  0 for all n  n6. Thus, it is not possible to encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage
without making fertility eort. Consequently, for n  n6, the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) provides a clan with
maximum utility u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2.
Second, consider the case of n6  n  n8. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when she
choose action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  k1). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), yielding vc = q(u(n8)  k1) =
q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) as well as vw = q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be the
case that s c(n) d hw  q(k1 c(n))+(1 q)r2 (i.e., s  qk1+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q+
hw + r2. Since (qk1 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw)  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= q

k1   d1 q   r2   c(n)

=
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q(c(n6)  c(n))  0, the above conditions result in s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2  qk1+(1  q)c(n)+(1  q)r2+d+hw.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n, which results in vc = u(n)   c(n)   d1 q   r2   hw   hc and vw =
c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2   c(n)  d  hw = r2 + qd1 q .
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be
case that q(s  c(n)  hw) + (1  q)r2  q(k1   c(n)) + (1  q)r2 (i.e., s  k1 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   d1 q   r2   c(n) = c(n6)  c(n)  0, the above conditions result in
k1 + hw  s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility q(u(n)  k1   hw   hc).
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), which results in vc
= q(u(n8)  k1   hw   hc) = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
Since q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) < q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2), the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+ r2+hw; a; e) is
not selected. Given an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) > u(n)  c(n) 
d
1 q   r2  hw   hc. Consequently, for n6  n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum
utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2).
Third, consider the case of n  n8. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when she choose
action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action l when she
rejects levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   c(n)   ). A clan
can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), yielding vc =
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) as well as vw = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility
eort for n  n8, it must be the case that s   c(n)   d   hw  r2 and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2, yielding s 
c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2  c(n) + d + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility
u(n)  c(n)  d1 q  r2 hw hc. A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n =
n8 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n8) c(n8)  d1 q  r2 hw hc and vw = s c(n8) d hw = r2+ qd1 q .
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be the case that
q(s c(n) hw)+(1 q)r2  r2 (i.e., s  c(n)+r2+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2, yielding c(n)+r2+hw  s 
c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n)+ r2+hw and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)  r2   hw   hc). A
clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results
in vc = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8) hw)+ (1  q)r2 = r2. Since q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) >
q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) due to  r2 < hw+hc, the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+r2+hw; a; e) is not selected.
Due to an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8) c(n8) ) > u(n8) c(n8)  d1 q r2 hw hc.
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Consequently, for n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n8) c(n8) ).
Now, compare utility u(n6)   c(n6)   d1 q   r2, q(u(n8)   c(n8)   r2), and q(u(n8)   c(n8)   ). Since
q(u(n8)   c(n8)   r2) > q(u(n8)   c(n8)   ), the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) is not selected. Here, note that
u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2

 q(u(n8) c(n8) r2) = (u(n6) k1) q(u(n8) k1) = u(n6) u(n8)+(1 q)(u(n8) k1).
Thus, when u(n8) k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility
r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2.
Subcase 3: k1 > c(n
) + d1 q + r2
Since c(n6) = k1   d1 q   r2 > c(n), c(n6) > c(n), so n6 > n. Consequently, n < n6 < n8.
First, consider the case of n  n6. In this case, a wife has an incentive to make fertility eort when she chooses
action z. Since k1 c(n) d  k1 c(n6) d > k1 c(n7) d = r2. So, a widow chooses action z and makes fertility
eort when she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility u(n)  k1. A
clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n6), yielding vc = u(n6) k1
= u(n6)   c(n6)   d1 q   r2 as well as vw = k1   c(n6)   d = r2 + qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate
marriage while making fertility eort, it must be the case that s  c(n)  d hw  k1  c(n)  d (i.e., s  k1+hw)
and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw + r2. Since k1+hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1  c(n)  d1 q   r2 = c(n6)  c(n)  0,
the above conditions result in s  k1 + hw  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains
utility u(n) k1 hw hc. A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n
 n6), which results in vc = u(n6) k1 hw hc = u(n6) c(n6)  d1 q  r2 hw hc and vw = s c(n6) d hw =
k1+hw c(n6) d hw = r2+ qd1 q . To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort,
it must be the case that q(s c(n) hw)+(1 q)r2  k1 c(n) d (i.e., s  k1q   dq   1 qq c(n)  1 qq r2+hw) and s 
c(n)+ d1 q+hw+r2. Since

k1
q   dq   1 qq c(n)  1 qq r2 + hw

 

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= 1q

k1   c(n)  d1 q   r2

= 1q (c(n6)   c(n))  0 for all n  n6. Thus, it is not possible to encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage
without making fertility eort. Consequently, for n  n6, the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) provides a clan with
maximum utility u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2.
Second, consider the case of n6  n  n8. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when she
choose action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action z when
she rejects levirate marriage. Given the action z taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)  k1). A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), yielding vc = q(u(n8)  k1) =
q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) as well as vw = q(k1   c(n8)) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be the
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case that s c(n) d hw  q(k1 c(n))+(1 q)r2 (i.e., s  qk1+(1 q)c(n)+(1 q)r2+d+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q+
hw + r2. Since (qk1 + (1  q)c(n) + (1  q)r2 + d+ hw)  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= q

k1   d1 q   r2   c(n)

=
q(c(n6)  c(n))  0, the above conditions result in s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2  qk1+(1  q)c(n)+(1  q)r2+d+hw.
Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility u(n)  c(n)  d1 q   r2   hw   hc. A clan can
maximize this utility by selecting n = n6 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2 hw hc
and vw = c(n6) +
d
1 q + hw + r2   c(n6)  d  hw = r2 + qd1 q .
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n6  n  n8, it must be
case that q(s  c(n)  hw) + (1  q)r2  q(k1   c(n)) + (1  q)r2 (i.e., s  k1 + hw) and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2.
Since k1 + hw  

c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2

= k1   d1 q   r2   c(n) = c(n6)  c(n)  0, the above conditions result in
k1 + hw  s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = k1 + hw and obtains utility q(u(n)  k1   hw   hc).
A clan can maximize this utility by selecting n = n8 (i.e., maximum in the domain of n  n8), which results in vc
= q(u(n8)  k1   hw   hc) = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8)  hw) + (1  q)r2 = r2.
Since q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) < q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2), the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+ r2+hw; a; e) is
not selected. Given an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2) > u(n6)  c(n6) 
d
1 q   r2  hw   hc. Consequently, for n6  n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) provides a clan with maximum
utility q(u(n8)  c(n8)  r2).
Third, consider the case of n  n8. In this case, a wife has no incentive to make fertility eort when she choose
action z. Since q(k1   c(n)) + (1   q)r2  q(k1   c(n8)) + (1   q)r2 = r2, a widow chooses action l when she
rejects levirate marriage. Given the action l taken by a widow, a clan obtains utility q(u(n)   c(n)   ). A clan
can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), yielding vc =
q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) as well as vw = r2. To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage while making fertility
eort for n  n8, it must be the case that s   c(n)   d   hw  r2 and s  c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2, yielding s 
c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2  c(n) + d + hw + r2. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n) + d1 q + hw + r2 and obtains utility
u(n)  c(n)  d1 q  r2 hw hc. A clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n =
n8 (corner solution), which results in vc = u(n8) c(n8)  d1 q  r2 hw hc and vw = s c(n8) d hw = r2+ qd1 q .
To encourage a widow to accept levirate marriage without making fertility eort for n  n8, it must be the case that
q(s c(n) hw)+(1 q)r2  r2 (i.e., s  c(n)+r2+hw) and s  c(n)+ d1 q +hw+r2, yielding c(n)+r2+hw  s 
c(n)+ d1 q +hw+ r2. Then, a clan chooses s = c(n)+ r2+hw and obtains utility q (u(n)  c(n)  r2   hw   hc). A
clan can maximize this utility subject to n  n8 > n. Then, a clan selects n = n8 (corner solution), which results
in vc = q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) and vw = q(s  c(n8) hw)+ (1  q)r2 = r2. Since q(u(n8)  c(n8)  ) >
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q (u(n8)  c(n8)  r2   hw   hc) due to  r2 < hw+hc, the strategy prole (n8; c(n8)+r2+hw; a; e) is not selected.
Due to an innitely large disease cost, it is also the case that q(u(n8) c(n8) ) > u(n8) c(n8)  d1 q r2 hw hc.
Consequently, for n  n8, the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) provides a clan with maximum utility q(u(n8) c(n8) ).
Now, compare utility u(n6)   c(n6)   d1 q   r2, q(u(n8)   c(n8)   r2), and q(u(n8)   c(n8)   ). Since
q(u(n8)   c(n8)   r2) > q(u(n8)   c(n8)   ), the strategy prole (n8; 0; l; e) is not selected. Here, note that
u(n6)  c(n6)  d1 q   r2

 q(u(n8) c(n8) r2) = (u(n6) k1) q(u(n8) k1) = u(n6) u(n8)+(1 q)(u(n8) k1).
Thus, when u(n8) k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility
r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility r2.
Case 2: d1 q + r2  0.
In this case, k1 > c(n
)  c(n) + d1 q + r2. Then, consider the case that k1 > c(n) + d1 q + r2. Similar to the
above Subcase 3, when u(n8)   k1 > u(n8) c(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow
obtains utility r2 +
qd
1 q . Otherwise, the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect and a widow obtains utility
r2.
Now, consider the Case 1 (including the Subcase 1 to Subcase 3) and Case 2 together. Then, assuming that r
= r2 < 0, k = k1 > c(n
), and the disease cost is high enough in the sense that    r2 < hc + hw  1, we get
1. When d1 q + r2 > 0
(a) and k1 <
d
1 q + r2 (in this case, n6 < 0 < n
 < n8), the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect,
along with the equilibrium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
(b) and d1 q + r2  k1  c(n) + d1 q + r2 (in this case, 0  n6  n < n8)
i. and u(n8)   k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the
equilibrium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
ii. and u(n8)   k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the
equilibrium number of children n6  n and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q < qd1 q .
(c) and k1 > c(n
) + d1 q + r2 (in this case, 0 < n
 < n6 < n8)
i. and u(n8)   k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the
equilibrium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
ii. and u(n8)   k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the
equilibrium number of children n6 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q <
qd
1 q .
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2. When d1 q + r2  0 and thus, k1 > c(n)  c(n) + d1 q + r2 (in this case, 0 < n < n6 < n8)
(a) and u(n8)   k1  u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n8; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equi-
librium number of children n8 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 < 0 < qd1 q .
(b) and u(n8)   k1 > u(n8) u(n6)1 q , the strategy prole (n6; 0; z; e) is subgame perfect, along with the equi-
librium number of children n6 > n
 and a widow's payo r2 + qd1 q = r2 +
d
1 q   d < 0 < qd1 q .
Summarizing these more succinctly yields proposition S.6.
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Table S.1: Summary statistics (DID estimates)
Coecient Standard R-sqd. No. of
Dependent variables: errors obs.
Per capita consumption (TSH) -11049.539* (6487.507) 0.007 2916
No. of biological children 0.153 (0.265) 0.019 2920
No. of biological sons 0.102 (0.161) 0.014 2920
No. of biological daughters 0.051 (0.168) 0.011 2920
Education (years) -0.201 (0.233) 0.023 2875
Widow (dummy) 0.012 (0.025) 0.008 2917
Age (years) 1.483* (0.759) 0.002 2920
Head's age (years) 1.123 (1.638) 0.027 2909
Head male (dummy) 0.059 (0.043) 0.008 2909
HH size 0.213 (0.664) 0.074 2916
HH land (acre) -0.836 (1.100) 0.037 2657
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Table S.2: Reason for migration: panel respondents aged 15 to 50 in wave 5
Male Female
(1) Economic reasons
Job-related 0.37 0.08
Look for land 0.10 0.02
(2) Schooling 0.09 0.06
(3) Family-related reasons
Marriage 0.03 0.53
Divorce 0.00 0.03
Death of parents 0.05 0.02
Inheritance 0.05 0.01
Illness of family members 0.00 0.00
Other 0.07 0.05
(4) Other 0.20 0.15
No. of migrants 500 839
Note: The gure is the proportion relative to the total number of migrants in each gender-category.
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Table S.3: Age heterogeneity: institutional change and widows' welfare (OLS)
Log of consumption Log of consumption Log of consumption per
per capita (TSH) per adult equivalent (TSH) adjusted adult equivalent (TSH)
Sample Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. No. of obs.
Aged 15 1.136*** (0.279) 0.816 0.674*** (0.244) 0.818 -0.565** (0.248) 0.863 138
Aged 15 to 16 -0.273 (0.506) 0.642 -0.340 (0.374) 0.653 -0.134 (0.415) 0.725 276
Aged 15 to 17 1.417*** (0.505) 0.568 1.105** (0.541) 0.558 0.510 (0.604) 0.629 421
Aged 15 to 18 0.943** (0.366) 0.497 0.746** (0.356) 0.488 0.449 (0.361) 0.586 560
Aged 15 to 19 0.690* (0.393) 0.461 0.371 (0.394) 0.450 -0.074 (0.397) 0.549 683
Aged 15 to 20 0.765* (0.395) 0.435 0.504 (0.377) 0.421 0.119 (0.364) 0.524 805
Aged 15 to 21 0.001 (0.191) 0.433 -0.053 (0.185) 0.422 -0.333 (0.212) 0.530 894
Aged 15 to 22 -0.033 (0.164) 0.422 -0.041 (0.172) 0.410 -0.249 (0.221) 0.530 1002
Aged 15 to 23 0.063 (0.151) 0.417 0.129 (0.152) 0.404 0.068 (0.211) 0.532 1098
Aged 15 to 24 -0.098 (0.204) 0.408 -0.055 (0.196) 0.402 -0.158 (0.219) 0.536 1204
Aged 15 to 25 -0.230 (0.225) 0.400 -0.175 (0.213) 0.395 -0.140 (0.242) 0.537 1303
Aged 15 to 26 -0.394* (0.233) 0.404 -0.355 (0.228) 0.398 -0.424 (0.287) 0.538 1380
Aged 15 to 27 -0.440** (0.205) 0.391 -0.410** (0.196) 0.386 -0.461* (0.251) 0.536 1451
Aged 15 to 28 -0.458*** (0.159) 0.391 -0.459*** (0.153) 0.382 -0.530** (0.222) 0.528 1553
Aged 15 to 29 -0.257 (0.157) 0.382 -0.268* (0.152) 0.375 -0.340 (0.219) 0.526 1638
Aged 15 to 30 -0.164 (0.127) 0.379 -0.186 (0.124) 0.372 -0.304 (0.193) 0.524 1756
Aged 15 to 31 -0.173 (0.120) 0.376 -0.158 (0.111) 0.368 -0.195 (0.160) 0.518 1812
Aged 15 to 32 -0.214* (0.114) 0.376 -0.211** (0.102) 0.368 -0.231 (0.164) 0.513 1894
Aged 15 to 33 -0.158 (0.097) 0.375 -0.168* (0.085) 0.365 -0.169 (0.149) 0.505 1946
Aged 15 to 34 -0.151 (0.091) 0.375 -0.170** (0.081) 0.366 -0.201 (0.144) 0.507 1995
Aged 15 to 35 -0.129 (0.089) 0.378 -0.162** (0.080) 0.369 -0.210 (0.138) 0.509 2052
Aged 15 to 36 -0.101 (0.090) 0.379 -0.142* (0.084) 0.370 -0.239 (0.147) 0.503 2103
Aged 15 to 37 -0.130 (0.097) 0.376 -0.164* (0.088) 0.367 -0.246* (0.141) 0.500 2156
Aged 15 to 38 -0.091 (0.097) 0.374 -0.124 (0.089) 0.365 -0.196 (0.147) 0.498 2195
Aged 15 to 39 -0.086 (0.091) 0.370 -0.127 (0.085) 0.361 -0.208 (0.138) 0.495 2237
Aged 15 to 40 -0.070 (0.086) 0.373 -0.116 (0.081) 0.363 -0.208 (0.130) 0.495 2290
Aged 15 to 41 -0.053 (0.082) 0.371 -0.096 (0.075) 0.361 -0.196 (0.122) 0.494 2319
Aged 15 to 42 -0.053 (0.074) 0.373 -0.091 (0.070) 0.362 -0.195 (0.123) 0.494 2358
Aged 15 to 43 -0.049 (0.074) 0.375 -0.088 (0.070) 0.363 -0.189 (0.122) 0.494 2389
Aged 15 to 44 -0.068 (0.080) 0.376 -0.108 (0.075) 0.365 -0.203* (0.119) 0.495 2416
Aged 15 to 45 -0.100 (0.081) 0.373 -0.141* (0.076) 0.362 -0.214* (0.114) 0.493 2448
Aged 15 to 46 -0.066 (0.084) 0.373 -0.113 (0.077) 0.364 -0.186* (0.111) 0.494 2482
Aged 15 to 47 -0.045 (0.086) 0.372 -0.086 (0.081) 0.361 -0.149 (0.116) 0.494 2516
Aged 15 to 48 -0.047 (0.084) 0.376 -0.091 (0.080) 0.364 -0.163 (0.112) 0.494 2545
Aged 15 to 49 -0.052 (0.075) 0.374 -0.115 (0.075) 0.361 -0.199* (0.108) 0.492 2573
Aged 15 to 50 -0.049 (0.074) 0.370 -0.105 (0.074) 0.357 -0.197* (0.106) 0.490 2616
Notes: (1) This table reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Figures
( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (3) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered residuals within each village.
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Table S.4: Institutional change and fertility: gender heterogeneity (OLS)
Dependent variables: No. of
Sons daughters
Sample: Head's Head's
wives aged wives aged
15 to 50 15 to 50
(a) (b)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 (a1) 0.086 -0.034
(0.270) (0.269)
 Aged 21 to 30 (a2) 0.166 0.278
(0.236) (0.260)
 Aged 31 to 40 (a3) 0.278 0.441
(0.234) (0.267)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.700** 0.284
(0.316) (0.303)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.098 0.440*
(0.265) (0.257)
Aged 31 to 40 0.113 0.366
(0.245) (0.252)
Education (years) -0.000 -0.001
(0.011) (0.012)
Head's age (years) -0.012** 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Head male -0.568 0.216
(0.412) (0.177)
HH size 0.253*** 0.301***
(0.030) (0.016)
HH land (acre) 0.010 -0.012
(0.010) (0.009)
Head's ethnicity YES YES
Head's religion YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES
Joint signicance (p-values)
a2+ a3 = 0 0.325 0.139
a1 + a2 + a3 = 0 0.440 0.314
R-squared 0.448 0.505
No. of obs. 1217 1217
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.5: Age heterogeneity: reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (OLS)
Log of consumption Log of consumption Log of consumption per
per capita (TSH) per adult equivalent (TSH) adjusted adult equivalent (TSH)
Sample Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. Coecient Std. R-sqd. No. of obs.
Aged 15 -0.458 (0.697) 0.744 -0.991 (0.712) 0.746 -1.607* (0.906) 0.772 390
Aged 15 to 16 0.006 (0.760) 0.606 -0.021 (0.776) 0.610 0.662 (0.794) 0.686 723
Aged 15 to 17 0.697 (0.517) 0.543 0.402 (0.542) 0.535 -0.202 (0.560) 0.612 1040
Aged 15 to 18 0.526* (0.266) 0.477 0.286 (0.261) 0.466 -0.158 (0.277) 0.561 1392
Aged 15 to 19 0.144 (0.274) 0.461 -0.044 (0.222) 0.452 -0.227 (0.215) 0.549 1678
Aged 15 to 20 0.275 (0.235) 0.443 0.124 (0.208) 0.432 -0.129 (0.239) 0.531 1974
Aged 15 to 21 0.368* (0.214) 0.441 0.207 (0.210) 0.430 -0.151 (0.229) 0.532 2182
Aged 15 to 22 0.094 (0.230) 0.431 -0.015 (0.209) 0.421 -0.172 (0.207) 0.534 2388
Aged 15 to 23 -0.076 (0.176) 0.430 -0.137 (0.158) 0.421 -0.188 (0.181) 0.543 2582
Aged 15 to 24 -0.123 (0.167) 0.427 -0.179 (0.148) 0.422 -0.216 (0.186) 0.552 2766
Aged 15 to 25 -0.079 (0.164) 0.418 -0.109 (0.152) 0.416 -0.120 (0.213) 0.559 2944
Aged 15 to 26 -0.256 (0.159) 0.398 -0.258* (0.146) 0.397 -0.328 (0.210) 0.555 3106
Aged 15 to 27 -0.311** (0.135) 0.388 -0.321*** (0.116) 0.388 -0.374** (0.167) 0.557 3240
Aged 15 to 28 -0.338*** (0.118) 0.383 -0.353*** (0.102) 0.382 -0.450*** (0.155) 0.556 3404
Aged 15 to 29 -0.251** (0.111) 0.381 -0.276*** (0.099) 0.380 -0.364** (0.153) 0.556 3562
Aged 15 to 30 -0.143 (0.100) 0.381 -0.177* (0.093) 0.379 -0.339** (0.142) 0.555 3762
Aged 15 to 31 -0.122 (0.089) 0.381 -0.153* (0.083) 0.376 -0.244* (0.135) 0.552 3890
Aged 15 to 32 -0.022 (0.103) 0.378 -0.053 (0.104) 0.372 -0.181 (0.134) 0.546 4040
Aged 15 to 33 0.039 (0.108) 0.375 0.004 (0.111) 0.368 -0.167 (0.129) 0.540 4142
Aged 15 to 34 0.060 (0.103) 0.375 0.026 (0.107) 0.368 -0.166 (0.124) 0.538 4244
Aged 15 to 35 0.095 (0.097) 0.378 0.063 (0.101) 0.371 -0.082 (0.134) 0.538 4362
Aged 15 to 36 0.078 (0.094) 0.380 0.048 (0.099) 0.373 -0.082 (0.130) 0.532 4493
Aged 15 to 37 0.050 (0.095) 0.377 0.033 (0.098) 0.371 -0.086 (0.122) 0.529 4611
Aged 15 to 38 0.035 (0.091) 0.374 0.028 (0.095) 0.367 -0.082 (0.118) 0.527 4719
Aged 15 to 39 0.018 (0.084) 0.371 0.007 (0.088) 0.365 -0.116 (0.107) 0.523 4818
Aged 15 to 40 0.018 (0.080) 0.369 0.005 (0.083) 0.363 -0.104 (0.106) 0.520 4950
Aged 15 to 41 -0.007 (0.072) 0.367 -0.023 (0.072) 0.361 -0.120 (0.095) 0.519 5032
Aged 15 to 42 -0.010 (0.068) 0.366 -0.030 (0.068) 0.359 -0.148 (0.091) 0.518 5120
Aged 15 to 43 -0.009 (0.068) 0.368 -0.028 (0.068) 0.361 -0.149 (0.092) 0.518 5187
Aged 15 to 44 0.001 (0.066) 0.369 -0.016 (0.065) 0.362 -0.141 (0.088) 0.518 5250
Aged 15 to 45 -0.010 (0.063) 0.368 -0.023 (0.061) 0.360 -0.140 (0.085) 0.518 5319
Aged 15 to 46 -0.014 (0.063) 0.368 -0.025 (0.060) 0.361 -0.150* (0.084) 0.517 5397
Aged 15 to 47 -0.030 (0.060) 0.364 -0.037 (0.057) 0.358 -0.151* (0.081) 0.516 5463
Aged 15 to 48 -0.047 (0.058) 0.367 -0.050 (0.056) 0.360 -0.162** (0.081) 0.515 5531
Aged 15 to 49 -0.048 (0.057) 0.365 -0.054 (0.056) 0.357 -0.164** (0.079) 0.513 5602
Aged 15 to 50 -0.046 (0.054) 0.364 -0.049 (0.054) 0.356 -0.146* (0.079) 0.513 5688
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Figures ( ) are standard errors. ***
denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (3) Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within
each village.
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Table S.6: Impacts on married women's bargaining power (OLS)
Dependent variable: A proportion of mother-related expenditures
Sample: Head's wives aged 15 to 50
Mother-related expenditures: (A) = (B )= (C) =
jewelry & perfume (A) + fabric, (B) + education
clothing, & shoes
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
 Aged 21 to 30 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
 Aged 31 to 40 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Aged 15 to 20 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.009 -0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Aged 21 to 30 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Aged 31 to 40 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Education (years) 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head's age (years) -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head male -0.023* -0.023* 0.011 0.010 -0.014*** -0.017***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005)
HH size 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
HH land (acre) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH total consumption - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.137 0.137 0.245 0.245 0.333 0.339
No. of obs. 1217 1217 1217 1217 1217 1217
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.7: Threats to identication (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of per capita consumption (TSH) No. of children
Sample: Females aged 15 to 28 Head's wives aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
No levirate marriage
 Widow -0.442*** -0.455*** -0.491*** -0.486*** - - - -
(0.155) (0.158) (0.148) (0.167)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - - - 0.052 0.069 0.068 0.002
(0.359) (0.338) (0.354) (0.379)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - - - 0.441 0.444 0.453* 0.403
(0.292) (0.277) (0.268) (0.287)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - - - 0.724* 0.728* 0.733** 0.594
(0.371) (0.369) (0.362) (0.362)
 Migrant in wave 5 0.017 - - - 0.125 - - -
(0.146) (0.268)
 Drop by wave 5 - -0.013 - - - -0.142 - -
(0.097) (0.348)
Widow
 Mortality rate - - 0.053 - - - - -
(0.048)
 No. of refugee camps - - - -0.140* - - - -
(0.074)
Aged 15 to 20
 Mortality rate - - - - - - -0.124 -
(0.131)
 No. of refugee camps - - - - - - - -0.091
(0.214)
Aged 21 to 30
 Mortality rate - - - - - - -0.068 -
(0.096)
 No. of refugee camps - - - - - - - -0.059
(0.098)
Aged 31 to 40
 Mortality rate - - - - - - -0.129 -
(0.088)
 No. of refugee camps - - - - - - - -0.191*
(0.110)
Migrant in wave 5 0.089 - - - -0.175 - - -
(0.138) (0.243)
Drop by wave 5 - 0.006 - - - -0.091 - -
(0.073) (0.185)
R-squared 0.394 0.391 0.392 0.393 0.730 0.731 0.731 0.731
No. of obs 1553 1553 1553 1553 1217 1217 1217 1217
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) Individual controls include all regressors used in the analysis in
Table 4 and Table 5, but the corresponding estimates are not reported here.
90
Table S.8: Checking on inuences of sample attrition (OLS)
Dependent variables: Log of per capita No. of children
consumption (TSH)
Sample: Females aged 15 to 28 Head's wives aged 15 o 50
Trim: Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom
16% 16% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
No levirate marriage
 widow -0.414** -0.413** - - - - - -
(0.155) (0.155)
 Aged 15 to 20 - - 0.206 0.013 0.210 0.016 - -
(0.380) (0.389) (0.381) (0.388)
 Aged 21 to 30 - - 0.397 0.475* - - - -
(0.272) (0.280)
 Aged 31 to 40 - - 0.594 0.715* - - - -
(0.391) (0.365)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - - 0.480 0.577* 0.389 0.570**
(0.302) (0.296) (0.234) (0.238)
Widow 0.106 0.148 - - - - - -
(0.097) (0.100)
Aged 15 to 20 0.055** 0.084*** -0.375 -0.464 -0.378 -0.467 -0.220 -0.455
(0.027) (0.027) (0.359) (0.390) (0.359) (0.389) (0.250) (0.303)
Aged 21 to 30 0.000 0.000 0.370 0.313 0.301 0.229 0.372 0.235
(0.000) (0.000) (0.263) (0.273) (0.272) (0.294) (0.236) (0.261)
Aged 31 to 40 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.477 0.583** 0.585* 0.656*** 0.590**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.340) (0.359) (0.283) (0.300) (0.245) (0.270)
Education (years) 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Head's age (years) -0.000 -0.000 -0.008 -0.011* -0.008 -0.011* -0.008 -0.011*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Head male 0.094** 0.118** 0.605*** -0.336 0.609*** -0.325 0.573*** -0.327
(0.045) (0.045) (0.201) (0.533) (0.201) (0.523) (0.190) (0.512)
HH size -0.048*** -0.050*** 0.549*** 0.541*** 0.549*** 0.541*** 0.548*** 0.541***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032)
HH land (acre) 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Village-time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.398 0.376 0.719 0.722 0.718 0.722 0.718 0.722
No. of obs. 1518 1510 1124 1130 1124 1130 1124 1130
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.9: Correlation between a household head and widowhood (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if a household head
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c)
No levirate marriage
 Widow 0.033 0.043 0.038
(0.080) (0.081) (0.064)
No levirate marriage -0.002 - -
(0.017)
Widow 0.597*** 0.593*** 0.327***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.058)
Aged 15 to 20 - - -0.215***
(0.022)
Aged 21 to 30 - - -0.191***
(0.022)
Aged 31 to 40 - - -0.106***
(0.019)
Education (years) - - 0.000
(0.001)
Head's age (years) - - -0.004***
(0.000)
Head male - - -0.316***
(0.018)
HH size - - -0.005**
(0.002)
HH land (acre) - - 0.002**
(0.001)
Head's ethnicity NO NO YES
Head's religion NO NO YES
Village FE YES NO NO
Region-time trend YES NO NO
Village-time trend NO YES YES
R-squared 0.277 0.290 0.580
No. of obs. 2917 2917 2616
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
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Table S.10: Impacts on a probability of being a head's wife (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if a head's wife
Sample: Females aged 15 to 50
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
No levirate marriage
 Aged 15 to 20 0.051 0.057 0.049 0.049 -
(0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074)
 Aged 21 to 30 0.018 0.019 0.008 - -
(0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
 Aged 31 to 40 0.034 0.038 0.029 - -
(0.084) (0.084) (0.083)
 Aged 21 to 40 - - - 0.016 -
(0.074)
 Aged 15 to 40 - - - - 0.028
(0.070)
No levirate marriage -0.478* -0.452 - - -
(0.271) (0.279)
Aged 15 to 20 -0.517*** -0.517*** -0.522*** -0.522*** -0.505***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.064)
Aged 21 to 30 -0.144** -0.142** -0.136* -0.142** -0.152**
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.070) (0.068)
Aged 31 to 40 -0.062 -0.062 -0.064 -0.054 -0.063
(0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.069) (0.066)
Education (years) -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Head's age (years) -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head male 0.606*** 0.606*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 0.604***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
HH size -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HH land (acre) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Head's ethnicity YES YES YES YES YES
Head's religion YES YES YES YES YES
Village leader char. NO YES NO NO NO
Village FE YES YES NO NO NO
Region-time trend YES YES NO NO NO
Village-time trend NO NO YES YES YES
R-squared 0.567 0.566 0.575 0.575 0.575
No. of obs. 2618 2566 2618 2618 2618
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village. (3) A head's ethnicity is classied into seven groups, i.e., Hangaza,
Haya, Nyambo, Shubi, Subi, Zinza, and other. (4) A head's religion is categorized into six groups, i.e., Muslim, Catholic, Protestant,
other Christian, traditional, and other.
93
Table S.11: Assessing the quality of HIV/AIDS-related information of the KHDS (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if HIV/AIDS is the most or second most important health problem in a community
Wave: wave 5 (i.e., 2004) wave 1 wave 1 to 4
(i.e., 1991) (i.e., 1991
to 1994)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
HIV prevalence of the nearest 2003?04 THIS community
Proportion 2.920* 2.597 - - - - - -
(1.494) (1.645)
One if proportion > 0 - - 0.373** 0.353** - - - -
(0.150) (0.161)
Mean HIV prevalence of 2003?04 THIS communities situated within 40-km radius from a KHDS community
Proportion - - - - 4.736 - - -
(3.006)
One if proportion > 0 - - - - - 0.492*** - -
(0.158)
The district-level HIV prevalence (proportion) - - - - - - 1.818** 2.722***
in 1987 based on Killewo et al. (1990) (0.756) (0.454)
Distance to the nearest - -0.004 - -0.004 - - - -
THIS community (km) (0.009) (0.008)
Wave FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.063 0.067 0.118 0.122 0.049 0.151 0.092 0.247
No. of obs. 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 204
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each village.
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Figure S.1: A woman and the typical expected inheritors
Note: This diagram should be seen from the viewpoint of a female indicated by a shaded circle. Consistent with the convention of
social anthropology, the triangles refer to males with the circles meaning females. The vertical and horizontal links represent a descent
bond and a co-descent bond, respectively. The sign `=' indicates a marital relationship. In this gure that considers the case that a
husband's father as well as grandfather has two wives, the triangles depicted by dashed lines indicate the expected inheritors from the
viewpoint of a female represented by the shaded circle, i.e., her husband's brothers and cousins born to his uncles on his father side.
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0 nnn2 n0 n1 n3
k0   r1
k0   r0
k1   r0
k1   r2
c(n)
u(n)  c(n)
Figure S.2: Graphical interpretation of the theoretical model
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Wave 1 Wave 5
KHDS villages
Widow
Other
ybefore = y of \Widow" - y of \Other"
KHDS villages
Widow
Other
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Figure S.3: Data structure and graphical representation of the identication strategy
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Figure S.4: Age heterogeneity: institutional change and widows' welfare (consumption per adult equivalent) (OLS)
Notes: (1) This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the
respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to
m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported in more detail in Table S.3.
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Figure S.5: Age heterogeneity: institutional change and widows' welfare (consumption per adjusted adult equiva-
lent) (OLS)
Notes: (1) This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (7) with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the
respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to
m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported in more detail in Table S.3.
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Figure S.6: Distribution of the number of children
Note: This gure reports the distribution of the number of children relevant to the observations exploited in the estimations in Table
5.
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Figure S.7: Age heterogeneity: reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (consumption per adult
equivalent) (OLS)
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that
the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported
in more detail in Table S.5.
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Figure S.8: Age heterogeneity: reduced-form impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' welfare (consumption per adjusted
adult equivalent) (OLS)
Notes: (1) After replacing Djt in equation (7) with an indicator for villages that referred to HIV/AIDS as the most or second most
important health problem in a community in each wave, this gure reports the estimated impacts of HIV/AIDS on widows' consumption
with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the respondents' age. (2) Age m in the horizontal axis means that
the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to m  1. (3) The estimates and statistical signicance are reported
in more detail in Table S.5.
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Figure S.9: Position of the KHDS (red circle) and 2003?04 THIS communities (blue square)
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